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REPUTATIONAL COSTS BEYOND TREATY 
EXCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW 
VIOLATIONS AS SECURITY THREAT  
FOCAL POINTS 
ANDREW C. BLANDFORD  
Given the rarity of direct sanctions for violations of international law, 
the rationality of compliance often hinges on a vague estimation of 
“reputational costs.” Rationalist international law scholars currently 
calculate noncompliance reputational costs as the price a state pays when 
excluded from future treaties due to its reputation as an unreliable treaty 
partner. From such limited reputational costs, it might follow that 
international law is powerless in the high stakes arena of international 
security. This Article, however, proposes a new form of noncompliance 
reputational costs. Following World War II, states signaled restraint by 
binding themselves to international security institutions. But violations of 
security-related commitments signal a threatening lack of restraint and 
have historically led to strategic reputational costs: (1) adverse alliance 
formation, (2) rivals’ increased armament, and (3) the denial of informal 
cooperation. In short, noncompliance reputational costs are not always 
limited to foregone treaty opportunities, but also include costs incurred 
when states balance against the violator in reaction to what this Article 
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terms “security threat focal points.” The reputational costs of violating 
international law are greater than previously estimated, strengthening the 
argument for rational compliance.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article connects two concepts—“security threat,” from 
international relations, and “focal points,” from game theory—to better 
address a fundamental international law question: When will it be rational 
for a state to comply with international law? In contrast to traditional 
international law theories that locate a “compliance pull” within the state 
itself,
1
 the rationalist approach assumes that the state is a unitary actor 
pursuing its own self-interest, with no innate preference for complying 
with international law.
2
 
Because direct sanctions for violations of international law are 
uncommon, the rationality of compliance often hinges on a vague 
estimation of “reputational costs.”3 Most international law scholars agree 
that fairly high levels of compliance can be achieved due to states’ 
concerns with their reputations.
4
 However, rationalist theory currently 
offers a somewhat unconvincing account of why noncompliance 
reputational costs should be significant: “the state with a poor reputation is 
either excluded from deals or it is charged a high price of admission . . . .”5 
In other words, rationalist international law scholars generally limit their 
calculation of noncompliance reputational costs to the violator’s loss of 
bargaining power, or total exclusion, when future treaties are negotiated. 
Therefore, rationalists argue that although international economic law 
(“IEL”) can prevent protectionism, in the realm of international security 
law (“ISL”)—i.e., “the laws of war, territorial limits, arms agreements, and 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Abram & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 179 
(1993) (arguing that bureaucracies operate with a presumption in favor of compliance); Thomas M. 
Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 706 (1988) (“[C]ompliance is 
secured . . . by perception of a rule as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed . . . .”); Harold 
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (describing 
a “process of interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms”). Koh explains that 
rationalist and normative theories “can be used together as complementary conceptual lenses,” id. at 
2651, and that rationalist theory “works best in such global issue areas as trade and arms control law, 
where nation-states remain the primary players,” id. at 2649.  
 2. ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 17 
(2008) (“[I]nterests are a function of state preferences, which are assumed to be exogenous and fixed. 
States do not concern themselves with the welfare of other states but instead seek to maximize their 
own gains or payoffs.”). 
 3. See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1823, 1856 (2002). 
 4. Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 231 (2009). 
 5. Id. at 245. See also Guzman, supra note 3, at 1847 (“[C]ountries will only enter into 
agreements with countries that have a good reputation . . . .”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
672 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:669 
 
 
 
 
so on”—the stakes are too high for such modest reputational costs to 
induce compliance.
6
 
In the international relations field, meanwhile, “reputation” is broadly 
defined as “a judgment about an actor’s past behavior that is used to 
predict future behavior.”7 Contemporary international relations theorists 
also explain that perceptions of security threat play a key role in shaping 
states’ strategic behavior.8  
This Article contends that reputational costs also arise when judgments 
that a state has violated international law lead to predictions of future 
security threat, as opposed to mere unreliability with respect to future 
treaty obligations. Given the information asymmetries in world politics, 
violations of ISL become what this Article terms “security threat focal 
points,” spotlighting the violator’s unpredictability and lack of restraint. 
Even while direct sanctions for noncompliance remain rare, violations of 
ISL can provoke other states to react strategically against the violator, 
often in concert.
9
 As explored below, violations of security-related 
commitments have historically led to strategic reputational costs: 
(1) adverse alliance formation, (2) rivals’ increased armament, and (3) the 
denial of informal cooperation.
10
 When such strategic reputational costs 
 
 
 6. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1825. 
 7. Gregory D. Miller, Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past, 
12 SEC. STUD. 40, 42 (2003); see also Brewster, supra note 4, at 235 n.4 (reviewing similar 
international relations definitions of reputation). Political scientists also recognize that “states maintain 
multiple reputations.” George Downs & Michael Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International 
Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S95 (2002); see also GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 72 (distinguishing 
between reputation in international law and “[m]uch of the existing [international relations] writing on 
reputation address[ing] a state’s reputation in the security arena,” primarily related to deterrence theory 
(citations omitted)).  
 8. See, e.g., Stephen M. Walt, Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power, 9 INT’L 
SEC. 3, 33 (1985) (“[S]tates form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with 
them.”); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Limits of American Power, 117 POL. SCI. Q. 545, 559 (2003) (applying 
“soft power” theory to explain when states will unite to balance against threats). 
 9. It is important to distinguish rationalist international law scholars’ narrow definition of 
“direct sanctions” from broader strategic responses to noncompliance. The field’s leading reputation 
scholar offers two examples of direct sanctions: (1) direct “retaliatory measures” against the violator 
(such as trade sanctions), and (2) treaty withdrawal. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1866. Elsewhere, 
Guzman defines “retaliation” as “explicit and costly punishments imposed by an aggrieved party 
against a violator,” GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 46, and distinguishes “reciprocity”—i.e., the expectation 
that “[a] violation by one side would likely provoke a violation by the other side.” Id. at 32. In 
contrast, the broad term “strategy,” as used in game theory, “is intended to focus on the 
interdependence of the adversaries’ decisions and on their expectations about each other’s behavior.” 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 3 n.1 (2d ed. 1980). 
 10. Distinguishable from formal treaty cooperation, examples of informal cooperation include 
collaborative voting at the United Nations (“UN”), ad hoc military contributions of troops, bases, or 
overflight rights, and the adoption of voluntary economic measures. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/2
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arise, jeopardizing the violator’s security interests, treaty exclusion costs 
will normally pale in comparison. 
Consistent with rationalist assumptions, the claim here is not that 
international law takes on such normative significance that states are 
hypersensitive to illegality per se. Rather, when a state fails to perform the 
security-related commitments that it has put in writing for the world to see, 
others take notice and often react strategically. When commitments to ISL 
are perceived as credible, states are more open to welfare-maximizing 
cooperation and less concerned with relative power.
11
 But when the 
credibility of those commitments is undermined, states tend to balance 
against the threatening defector. 
Nor does this Article claim that ISL violations are the only source of 
security threat focal points in international relations. The underlying 
armament or use of force, for example, will also signal a certain degree of 
threat. Yet this Article contends that the violation (1) shines a spotlight on 
the threat of the underlying action, (2) creates the threatening perception 
that the state does not intend to be bound by the restraints to which it 
previously committed, and (3) facilitates international coordination in 
identifying and responding to the threat. When a state arms itself or uses 
force consistently with its international obligations, it operates within a 
policy space previously designated as acceptable, or at least not prohibited. 
But when a state arms itself or uses force inconsistently with its 
international obligations, it steps across a line demarcating threatening 
behavior, raising a red flag to other states. In a world of asymmetric 
information regarding states’ strategic intentions, it is the ISL violation 
that can make the difference between a less threatening permissible 
security operation, on the one hand, and a provocative defection from the 
international order, on the other. 
In short, noncompliance reputational costs are not always limited to 
foregone treaty opportunities but also include costs incurred when states 
balance against the violator in reaction to the security threat focal point. 
Therefore, the reputational costs of violating ISL are greater than 
previously estimated, strengthening the argument for rational compliance.  
 
 
 11. See G. John Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American 
Postwar Order, 23 INT’L SEC. 43, 44 (1999) (“It was the exercise of strategic restraint—made good by 
an open polity and binding institutions—more than the direct and instrumental exercise of hegemonic 
domination that ensured a cooperative and stable postwar order.”); see also JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 208 (5th ed. 2005) (illustrating a spectrum between 
relations where security is the dominant goal and relations where welfare is the dominant goal). 
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This Article explores these noncompliance reputational costs that go 
beyond foregone treaty opportunities, imperiling the violator’s security. 
Part II reviews the rationalist international law literature on reputation, 
focusing on Andrew Guzman’s theory of direct and reputational sanctions, 
as well as responding critiques. Part III develops the security threat focal 
point theory previewed above, importing key concepts from international 
relations and game theory. Part IV applies this theory to historical case 
studies, finding that, for example: the correct “lesson of Munich” was not 
the need to respond to minor threats with unilateral war, but the rationality 
of coordinating for defense around violations of ISL; Soviet violations of 
the Allies’ wartime agreements helped to cement a new alliance system 
favorable to the United States at the outset of the Cold War; and the 
Chinese model of maximizing relative power while minimizing relative 
threat reveals the stickiness of international institutions. Part V concludes 
by suggesting a more critical role for security threat focal points in today’s 
multipolar world of dispersed threats. 
II. BACKGROUND: THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF REPUTATION  
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
In 1960, game theorist Thomas Schelling wrote: “A potent means of 
commitment, and sometimes the only means, is the pledge of one’s 
reputation.”12 By 1984, international relations scholar Robert Keohane 
explained: “Regimes rely not only on decentralized enforcement through 
retaliation but on governments’ desires to maintain their reputations.”13 
Soon thereafter, reputation had become “the linchpin of the dominant 
neoliberal institutionalist theory of decentralized cooperation.”14 
In international law scholarship, however, compliance theory 
traditionally focused on the normative power of law, rather than its 
instrumental role in facilitating cooperation between states. In 2002, 
Andrew Guzman claimed to be the first international law scholar to 
formally and fully study the reputational costs of noncompliance.
15
 
Guzman theorizes that because the application of direct sanctions imposes 
costs on sanctioning and sanctioned states alike, all states have an 
incentive to “free ride,” relying on others to sanction the violator.16 Given 
 
 
 12. SCHELLING, supra note 9, at 29.  
 13. ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 108 (1984). 
 14. Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at S95. 
 15. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1845 n.85. 
 16. Id. at 1869. 
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the resulting lack of direct sanctions to enforce international law, the state 
offers its reputation for compliance as a form of collateral.
17
  
To illustrate how a sufficiently high reputational cost will lead rational 
states to comply, Guzman presents a parsimonious model based on the 
assumption that “countries will only enter into agreements with countries 
that have a good reputation.”18 In other words, the reputational cost of 
violating international law is based on the harm to the state’s future 
bargaining power: “[F]ailure to live up to one’s commitments harms one’s 
reputation and makes future commitments less credible. As a result, 
potential partners are less willing to offer concessions in exchange for a 
promised course of action.”19 Guzman’s conservative methodology 
provides the foundation for his strong argument establishing the key role 
of reputational costs in compliance theory. However, his focus on 
reputational costs associated with future treaty negotiations, to the general 
exclusion of strategic reputational costs, leads him to underestimate the 
importance of international law in the security context. Guzman concludes 
that “many of the topics that receive the most attention in international 
law—the laws of war, territorial limits, arms agreements, and so on—are 
unlikely to be affected by international law.”20  
Subsequent discussions of reputation in the international law literature 
have sought to further limit the estimation of noncompliance reputational 
costs. In 2005, rational choice theorists and international law skeptics Jack 
Goldsmith and Eric Posner acknowledged that reputation was one possible 
explanation for compliance: “States refrain from violating treaties (when 
they do) for the same basic reason that they refrain from violating non-
legal agreements: because they fear retaliation from other states or some 
kind of reputational loss, or because they fear a failure of coordination.”21 
Yet Goldsmith and Posner cite various reasons why “reputational 
arguments must be made with care”: (1) states have multiple reputations in 
different areas of international law, (2) treaties are sometimes rendered 
obsolete by changing circumstances, and (3) to maximize coercive power, 
states might actively seek to develop reputations that are in conflict with a 
reputation for compliance with international law.
22
  
 
 
 17. Id. at 1849–50. 
 18. Id. at 1847. 
 19. Id. at 1849–50 (citations omitted). 
 20. Id. at 1825. 
 21. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 102; see Andrew T. Guzman, The Limits of International Law: Reputation and 
International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 379, 381 (2006) (reviewing GOLDSMITH & POSNER, 
supra note 21). 
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The first of these observations is consistent with a strong reputational 
incentive to comply because a state will seek to protect its distinct 
reputations within specific areas of international law.
23
 Goldsmith and 
Posner’s second reservation, regarding obsolete treaties, can merely 
involve situations in which neither party cares about compliance with a 
dead letter.
24
 Nonetheless, as will be further discussed, Goldsmith and 
Posner are right to question the strength of reputational costs where 
international institutions have been undermined: when ISL violations 
come to be considered poor proxies for threat, states find it more difficult 
to coordinate for security.
25
 Finally, with respect to Goldsmith and 
Posner’s third concern, international relations scholars have shown that 
while states sometimes react to threats with “bandwagoning” strategies 
favorable to the coercive state, historically they more often balance against 
coercive power—thus producing the strategic reputational costs explored 
in this Article.
26
 
Most recently, in 2009, Professor Brewster suggested that reputational 
costs are lower than often assumed because (1) new governments can 
repair a state’s damaged reputation, and (2) other states understand that the 
reasons behind noncompliance in one issue area are irrelevant to 
compliance decisions in other areas.
27
 First, Brewster asks, “Whose 
reputation?” Drawing on Michael Tomz’s work on reputations for 
sovereign debt repayment, Brewster argues that a single government can 
often alter a state’s reputation.28 Brewster points out that individual 
governments decide whether to comply with international obligations, 
bearing only some of the state’s past and future noncompliance 
reputational costs.  
Guzman, on the other hand, argues that the “ability of a new regime to 
avoid the reputational stigma of past state-sponsored actions will depend a 
great deal on the particular circumstances of the case.”29 In the security 
context, for many of the states perceived by the West as the most 
threatening—e.g., China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia—the true 
 
 
 23. Guzman, supra note 22, at 382. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing World War II and the obsolescence of the Treaty of 
Versailles). 
 26. See Walt, supra note 8, at 15 (“[B]alance of power theorists from [Leopold von] Ranke 
forward have persistently and persuasively shown that states facing an external threat overwhelmingly 
prefer to balance against the threat rather than bandwagon with it.”). 
 27. Brewster, supra note 4, at 232–33. 
 28. Id. at 259 (citing MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: 
SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES 18–28 (2007)).  
 29. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1865. 
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decision-makers have remained essentially the same over a considerable 
period of time. More importantly, domestic politics are often complex and 
unpredictable, especially from a foreign perspective.
30
 Given that no state 
can directly observe foreign governments’ preferences for respecting 
international commitments, Goldsmith and Posner have shown that 
reputation functions as shorthand for the credibility of internal foreign 
policy-making: “One can thus, by treating each state as having private 
information about the quality of its foreign policy determinants and as 
having limited information about the quality of other states’ foreign policy 
determinants, rely on economic models of reputation that are based on 
asymmetric information.”31 In light of information asymmetries regarding 
states’ intentions, the mere observation of a change in government will 
rarely prompt reevaluations of the state’s reputation in the absence of 
strong new evidence of compliance.
32
  
Second, Brewster asks, “A reputation for what?” Like Goldsmith and 
Posner, she notes that states have multiple reputations across different 
treaty regimes. Brewster further argues that “compliance with international 
rules is a function of domestic support for the goals of the treaty regimes 
as well as respect for international legal obligations. Changes within the 
state, such as a change in the coalition supporting the government in 
power, can lead to different policy preferences,” which can affect 
compliance with some agreements but not others.
33
  
Noncompliance in any one case may indeed be more rationally 
attributed to the state’s situation than to its disposition. Guzman accounts 
for this distinction in his list of factors that influence the reputational 
impact of a violation: “(1) the severity of the violation, (2) the reasons for 
the violation, (3) the extent to which other states know of the violation, 
and (4) the clarity of the commitment and the violation.”34 If the reasons 
for the violation are clearly situational, then the state will not suffer 
reputational costs with respect to issue areas where the situation does not 
apply. To take Brewster’s example, while a recession may result in 
domestic pressure to violate trade agreements, it probably will not make a 
state more likely to violate a military alliance or an environmental 
 
 
 30. Id. at 1839.  
 31. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 21, at 101. 
 32. See Miller, supra note 7, at 50 (“Reputations are important not just because of repeated 
interaction, but because information about an actor’s preferences and intentions is incomplete. . . . This 
uncertainty [for firms in the market] is intensified in the anarchic international political system.”). 
 33. Brewster, supra note 4, at 260 (emphasis omitted). 
 34. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1861 (emphasis added). 
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agreement.
35
 Under such circumstances, other states might be expected to 
recognize specific situational factors behind the violation and might not 
make broad dispositional attributions regarding the state’s general level of 
respect for international law. 
Indeed, political scientist Jonathan Mercer notes that because “a 
reputation is a judgment about another’s character, only dispositional 
attributions can generate a reputation.”36 But even if we assume that a 
rational state has situational reasons for violating international law, it may 
be unwise for it to assume that all other states are equally informed and 
rational, such that its reputational costs will be negligible.
37
 Mercer applies 
his social psychology research to international relations and theorizes that 
“[a]s a result of [cognitive] biases, we are likely to view the cause of 
undesirable behavior to be the other’s disposition, and the cause of 
desirable behavior to be the situation our policy either created or 
exploited: 
 Undesirable behavior  dispositional attribution  
 Desirable behavior  situational attribution”38 
Thus, social psychology suggests that reputation is created more readily by 
our adversaries’ “undesirable” or “antisocial” behavior (e.g., breaking the 
law) than by their “desirable behavior.” This result is magnified in the face 
of threat: “When a state acts in a way that threatens us, we assume the act 
was intended to threaten us and was taken in spite of our policy (never 
because of it); the act reflects on the state’s disposition.”39 The conscious 
violation of ISL can result in the inference of an aggressive disposition, as 
in domestic criminal law where mens rea can be inferred from the 
 
 
 35. Brewster, supra note 4, at 259–60. 
 36. JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 6 (1996). 
 37. Even within rationalist scholarship, the assumption of perfect rationality has often been 
relaxed. See, e.g., KEOHANE, supra note 13, at 67 (“Once the [institutionalist] argument has been 
established in this way, it can be modified . . . by relaxing the key assumptions of rationality and 
egoism to allow for the impacts of bounded rationality, changes in preferences, and empathy on state 
behavior.”); Jerel A. Rosati, The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics, 2 INT’L 
STUD. REV. 45, 73 (2000) (“If we must ‘black box’ the state, it should be treated as a cognitive actor in 
pursuit of a dominant goal or preference. . . . [I]nternational actors are purposive, conditioned by 
bounded rationality and regular cognitive propensities.”).  
 38. MERCER, supra note 36, at 63; see also ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 343 (1976) (“When the other behaves in accord with the actor’s desires, he 
will overestimate the degree to which his policies are responsible for the outcome. . . . When the 
other’s behavior is undesired, the actor is likely to see it as derived from internal sources rather than as 
being a response to his own actions.”).  
 39. MERCER, supra note 36, at 62–63 (citing, inter alia, SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, 
SOCIAL COGNITION 86 (1984)).  
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conscious commission of a proscribed act. Therefore, even the most 
rational state must recognize the likelihood that its rivals will draw 
dispositional inferences—leading to reputational predictions—from its 
violations of international law. 
On the other hand, Tomz argues that, at least in sovereign debt 
markets, reputations are formed through rational interpretations of states’ 
histories of repayment.
40
 Institutional investors, however, have access to 
financial data and can diversify their investments to manage risk. In 
contrast, when evaluating potential security threats, states are more likely 
to be risk averse and less likely to rely on objective data.
41
 Therefore, 
states will more often make dispositional attributions in the face of 
security threats. Finally, even allowing for investors’ fine situational 
distinctions, Tomz concludes that “empirical tests, across three centuries 
of financial history, give[] confidence in the reputational theory.”42 
The classic social psychology concept of “fundamental attribution 
error” described by Mercer refers to the human tendency to 
disproportionately make dispositional attributions in response to the 
undesirable behavior of others. However, given the information 
asymmetries inherent in world politics, dispositional attribution will often 
be the rational response to noncompliance. Even without relaxing the 
assumption that every state is rational by relying on Mercer’s social 
psychology theory, a reputation for threat will form whenever the limited 
information that a state receives about a rival’s preference for 
noncompliance indicates that it does not intend to comply in the future.  
At present, “our understanding of reputation is primitive.”43 One finds 
“comments scattered throughout the international law literature implying 
that scholars understood all along that reputation and repeat play were 
important in the international legal system.”44 But the systematic study of 
reputation in the field of international law is less than a decade old. Today, 
rationalist international law scholars generally limit their calculation of 
 
 
 40. TOMZ, supra note 28, at 18, 29 (referring to Mercer’s psychological approach to reputation 
formation as an alternative to his more rationalist account). 
 41. See Miller, supra note 7, at 49–50 (“[T]here is nothing in international politics comparable to 
a credit report. States cannot evaluate past behavior as easily as economic actors can. . . . Although a 
company might have thousands of customers and could afford to alienate one or two, firms still care 
about their reputations. If a state, by contrast, loses one or two allies, that could be extremely 
damaging to its security.”). 
 42. TOMZ, supra note 28, at 229. 
 43. Guzman, supra note 22, at 390. 
 44. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1845 n.85; see also id. at 1846 n.91 (citing, inter alia, LOUIS 
HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 46–59 (1979) (identifying reputation as 
a factor in states’ compliance decisions)). 
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noncompliance reputational costs to the price a state pays when excluded 
from future treaties (or charged a high price of admission) due to its 
reputation as an unreliable treaty partner. From such limited reputational 
costs, it might follow that international law is powerless in the high stakes 
arena of international security. Part III of this Article, however, proposes a 
new form of noncompliance reputational costs. 
III. SECURITY THREAT FOCAL POINT THEORY 
Following the approach of Guzman, Brewster, Goldsmith, and Posner, 
this Article turns now to international relations and game theory concepts 
to form the basis for its approach to international law compliance theory.  
A. Security Threat and Strategic Balancing in International Relations 
Versus International Law Theory 
Traditionally, international law scholars have either ignored or pushed 
back against—rather than made theoretical use of—realist concepts such 
as security threat and strategic balancing.
45
 Jonathan Greenberg recently 
described the stigmatization of such realist concepts within the 
international law literature: 
Because I share the values and research agenda of liberal 
internationalists, I am concerned that we’ve too quickly thrown out 
the baby (compelling insights and useful tools realism offers) with 
the bathwater (its limits and slipperiness as an explanatory theory, 
 
 
 45. This Article uses the term “realism” in the international relations sense, not to be confused 
with domestic “legal realism.” While both theories cite power and politics as key determinants of law, 
legal realism maintains that law still functions as an independent variable in domestic courts. See 
Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and 
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 750 (2010) (“For legal realists, 
however, it is not as if legal texts and legal doctrine do not matter at all. Legal texts and doctrine are 
simply insufficient to understand judicial interpretation and outcomes in actual cases.”). In contrast, 
international relations “structural realists” argue that international law is of little or no importance in 
the anarchic international system where states violate international law whenever it is in their interests 
to do so. See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 64, 71–76 (2006) (describing variations of realist theory). The institutionalist challenge to 
structural realism also assumes that states pursue their own self-interest in an international system 
lacking centralized enforcement of international law. See KEOHANE, supra note 13, at 108–09. Yet 
institutionalists, like domestic legal realists, assert that legal institutions often operate as independent 
variables, modifying the effects of power politics. As explained above, reputation is the linchpin of the 
institutionalist argument. 
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and its tendency to justify status quo power arrangements as a 
consequence of anarchy’s inexorable logic).46 
Some international law scholars have looked to the realist school of 
international relations as a source of academic insight,
47
 while others have 
shown that realism faces serious challenges. For example, the extreme 
“structural realist” belief that international law is epiphenomenal faces the 
problematic fact that states allocate substantial resources toward 
influencing its development.
48
 Nonetheless, Richard Steinberg has noted 
that “[m]any international law articles perpetuate a common misperception 
that realism is a monolithic approach that denies any role for law,” while 
in fact “most contemporary realists believe that law may define credible 
commitments.”49 
Meanwhile, “[r]ealist perspectives remain dominant in current 
international relations scholarship,” according to Greenberg.50 Moreover, 
the most revered institutionalist voices continually reaffirm the centrality 
of security and power in international relations. For Keohane: “Realist 
theories that seek to predict international behavior on the basis of interests 
and power alone are important but insufficient for an understanding of 
world politics. They need to be supplemented, though not replaced, by 
theories stressing the importance of international institutions.”51 Similarly, 
Joseph Nye warns, “[t]o ignore the role of force and the centrality of 
 
 
 46. Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1789, 1792 (2003). 
 47. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1176 (1999) (“In this Article we have borrowed from two traditions in the 
international relations literature . . . . Realism is skeptical about international cooperation and 
international law. By contrast, the second tradition—institutionalism—is more optimistic about 
international cooperation and international law.”); Noah Feldman, When Judges Make Foreign Policy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, (Magazine), at 50, 66 (“Law comes into being and is sustained not 
because the weak demand it but because it is a tool of the powerful. . . . It is easier and cheaper to get 
the compliance of weaker people or states by promising them rules and a fair hearing than by 
threatening them constantly with force.”). Of course, it is common for international law scholars to 
note the limitations of enforcement mechanisms or the distributive consequences of treaty 
negotiations. 
 48. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1837. Structural realists assume that in “an anarchic self-help state 
system, security depends on relative state power, which means that international outcomes are zero-
sum.” Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 45, at 74–75 (“[O]ther than structural realists, few make this 
claim” that “international law has no autonomous explanatory power . . . .”). 
 49. Richard H. Steinberg, Overview: Realism in International Law, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 260, 261 (2002). Steinberg also notes that although “most leading international law theorists 
pay some homage to power, the realist approach does not often find its way to the center of 
conversations in U.S. law schools.” Id. at 260. 
 50. Greenberg, supra note 46, at 1804 (“Scholars representing a variety of approaches within a 
realist paradigm generate volumes of new research on issues of paramount concern to international law 
scholarship . . . .”). 
 51. KEOHANE, supra note 13, at 14. 
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security would be like ignoring oxygen. Under normal circumstances, 
oxygen is plentiful and we pay it little attention. But once those conditions 
change and we begin to miss it, we can focus on nothing else.”52  
Nye envisions a spectrum along which the relationships of various 
adversaries or allies can be positioned between realist and institutionalist 
poles.
53
 At the realist pole, “military force is the dominant instrument, and 
security is the dominant goal.”54 Meanwhile, at the institutionalist pole, 
“economic manipulation and the use of international institutions are the 
dominant instruments,” and “welfare is the dominant goal.”55 Importantly 
for present purposes, relationships can move along Nye’s spectrum over 
time as states become more or less focused on welfare maximization or 
security. When states move across the spectrum toward realism in 
response to a salient security threat, they will not only return their focus to 
maximizing relative power rather than global welfare, but they will also 
adopt strategies to counter that threat. 
Stephen Walt employs a metaphor similar to Nye’s in expressing the 
centrality of security in international relations: although the underlying 
forces of realism are as strong and pervasive as gravity, an international 
institution may still be built to fly.
56
 Those underlying forces are the 
uncertainty and anarchy natural to international relations, explaining the 
tendency of states to balance strategically. Where the uncertainty 
regarding others’ intentions can be decreased, even many realists theorize 
that security regimes can alter states’ behavior by shifting their 
expectations. According to Robert Jervis:  
[I]f [a state] believes a regime is likely to last, [it] will be more 
likely to “invest” in it (in the sense of accepting larger short-run 
risks and sacrifices) in the expectation of reaping larger gains in the 
future. Important here is the expectation that peace could be 
maintained. If war were seen as likely, states would have to 
 
 
 52. Nye, supra note 8, at 550–51. 
 53. NYE, supra note 11, at 208. For example, Nye places the India-Pakistan and Israel-Syria 
dyads near the realist end of the spectrum and relations within the European Union near the 
institutionalist end of the spectrum. Notably, Nye suggests that the relationship between the United 
States and China is centered between realism and institutionalism. Id. at 207. See infra Part IV.D.2 
(discussing the rise of China). 
 54. NYE, supra note 11, at 207 (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. (emphasis added). 
 56. Stephen M. Walt, The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition, in POLITICAL SCIENCE: 
THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 201 (Ira Katnelson & Helen Milner eds., 2002).  
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concentrate on building up their short-run power to prepare for the 
coming conflict.
57
 
But where states have invested in a security regime’s promise of peace and 
that regime is then undermined by defection, risk-averse states will react 
by shifting their expectations to conflict. Expectations of conflict lead to 
increased alliance formation and armament as well as the denial of 
cooperation to limit rivals’ relative power.58 
Historically, there has been an “overwhelming tendency for states to 
balance rather than bandwagon” in response to security threats, “primarily 
because an alignment that preserves most of a state’s freedom of action is 
preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemon.”59  
Because intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable, it is 
safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong 
states will remain benevolent. The overwhelming tendency for 
states to balance rather than bandwagon defeated the hegemonic 
aspirations of Spain under Philip II, France under Louis XIV and 
Napoleon, and Germany under Wilhelm II and Hitler.
60
  
Therefore, perceptions of threat are more likely to hurt a state’s interests 
than help it by increasing its coercive power: “the more aggressive or 
expansionist a state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing 
coalition.”61 
Professor Walt was the first to formally articulate what is intuitive to 
observers of modern world politics: states tend to react against threats.
62
 In 
contrast to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism—maintaining that states 
balance only against power and therefore tend to balance against all 
hegemons—Walt claims that states balance against the greatest threats to 
their security.
63
 Professor Walt’s theory thereby serves as a bridge 
 
 
 57. Robert Jervis, Security Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 182 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 
1981). 
 58. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the expectations of conflict accompanying the rise of 
Germany before World War I). 
 59. Walt, supra note 8, at 15. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 13. See also Josef Joffe, How America Does It, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 13, 16 (1997) (“Those 
who coerce or subjugate others are far more likely to inspire hostile alliances than nations that contain 
themselves, as it were.”). 
 62. Walt, supra note 8, at 12, 15.  
 63. Christopher Layne, The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of 
American Hegemony, in BALANCE OF POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 113 (T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz & Michel Fortmann eds., 2004).  
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connecting contemporary realism to institutionalist approaches.
64
 For 
example, Nye’s “soft power” theory also explains when states will tend to 
balance against threats: 
American preponderance is softened when it is embodied in a web 
of multilateral institutions . . . . When the society and culture of the 
hegemon are attractive, the sense of threat and need to balance it are 
reduced. Whether other countries will unite to balance American 
power will depend on how the United States behaves as well as the 
power resources of potential challengers.
65
 
Thus, the concept of balancing against security threat is integral to both 
Walt’s contemporary realist theory and Nye’s neoliberal institutionalism, 
which are among the most influential theories in international relations 
today.
66
 Although Nye is more optimistic about states’ abilities to avoid 
war, he does not discount the strategic costs incurred when a state is 
perceived as threatening.  
While the concepts of security threat and strategic balancing are as 
omnipresent as “oxygen” and “gravity” to these international relations 
scholars, perhaps it is not surprising to find them conceptually 
unincorporated into most of the international law literature. After all, 
power politics is the antithesis of legal regulation. Rationalist international 
law scholars generally accept the institutionalist theory that states use 
international institutions to engage in strategic restraint, allowing for the 
pursuit of global welfare maximization.
67
 However, these scholars do not 
 
 
 64. Id. at 114. 
 65. Nye, supra note 8, at 559 (citing Joffe, supra note 61, at 27). In fact, Nye’s “soft power” 
theory expresses in positive terms essentially what Walt’s “balance of threat” theory expresses in 
negative terms. Stated in the negative: when a state is perceived as threatening, others will balance 
against it. Stated in the positive: when a state is perceived as non-threatening—even to the extent that 
its policies are attractive—others will tend to bandwagon with it. Compare JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT 
POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at x (2004) (“As General Wesley Clark put it, 
soft power ‘gave [the United States] an influence far beyond the hard edge of traditional balance-of-
power politics.’”), with Walt, supra note 8, at 33 (explaining that the United States enjoyed a 
“favorable imbalance of power” during the Cold War because it was perceived by the medium powers 
of Europe and Asia as less threatening than the Soviet Union). 
 66. See Richard Jordan, Daniel Maliniak, Amy Oaks, Susan Peterson & Michael J. Tierney, One 
Discipline or Many?: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in Ten Countries 43 (2009) 
(ranking Walt and Nye, as well as Keohane and Jervis, among the top twenty scholars having “the 
greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years,” as determined by a poll of 2,724 
international relations scholars). 
 67. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 3, at 1839–40 (adopting institutionalism). Institutionalism, like 
realism, treats states as “rational unitary agents interacting in an anarchical world,” yet maintains “that 
institutions can reduce verification costs in international affairs, reduce the cost of punishing cheaters, 
and increase the repeated nature of interaction, all of which make cooperation more likely.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2011] REPUTATIONAL COSTS BEYOND TREATY EXCLUSION 685 
 
 
 
 
seem to have considered what costs could result from reversals of 
restraint—i.e., the costs incurred when relations between states move away 
from institutionalism and toward realism on Nye’s spectrum, in response 
to a salient security threat.  
Indeed, most rationalist international law scholars, such as Guzman, 
ignore the potentially prohibitive strategic costs of noncompliance in the 
“high stakes” security arena: 
[I]nternational law is more likely to have an impact on events when 
the stakes are relatively modest. The implication is that many of the 
topics that receive the most attention in international law—the laws 
of war, territorial limits, arms agreements, and so on—are unlikely 
to be affected by international law.
68
 
Although international law may be more likely to have an impact when the 
stakes are low,
69
 it is far more consequential in the security context than 
Guzman suggests. For the sake of simplicity, Guzman’s model of 
reputational costs is based on the assumption that “countries will only 
enter into agreements with countries that have a good reputation.”70 He 
acknowledges that violations of more important obligations lead to larger 
reputational costs.
71
 Yet, for Guzman, it does not follow that ISL 
commitments are likely to be honored because the incentive to defect is 
greater when the stakes are high.
72
 However, one would expect to find a 
strong correlation between high stakes defections and perceptions of 
security threats—leading to costly strategic balancing that is unaccounted 
for by Guzman’s model. When such strategic reputational costs arise, 
treaty exclusion costs will normally pale in comparison because strategic 
 
 
 68. Id. at 1825. 
 69. In general, IEL is more “enforceable” than ISL, but not necessarily because the stakes are 
lower. Rather, international trade law and international investment law both feature compulsory 
dispute settlement mechanisms. The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) provide direct sanctions as well as clear focal points 
imposing reputational costs on states that refuse to comply. See Understanding on Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 (providing for compulsory dispute 
settlement in article 6 and authorizing trade sanctions in the event of noncompliance in article 22); 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States 
art. 25, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force on 
Oct. 14, 1966) (“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of 
an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing [e.g., in an investment treaty] to submit to the Centre.”). 
 70. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1847. 
 71. GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 85. 
 72. Id. 
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costs imperil the violator’s security. Although international law does not 
always prevent states from, for example, conducting illegal warfare, the 
potential for high reputational costs does affect state behavior in the 
security context.  
This examination of the core international relations concept of security 
threat has shown how defection from international security institutions can 
provoke states to balance against the unrestrained threat. To better 
distinguish between the causal effect of a violation of international law 
and that of the underlying action itself, this Article now turns to the focal 
point concept from game theory. 
B. Focal Points in Game Theory and International Law Theory 
Because information regarding rivals’ strategic intentions is 
asymmetric, states face challenges—individually and collectively—in 
determining which rivals pose the greatest threats to their security. Allies 
will be wary of committing scarce resources to resist what they perceive as 
only a modest threat to their own security.
73
 According to Henry 
Kissinger: 
Only when a threat is truly overwhelming and genuinely affects all, 
or most, societies is such a consensus [for collective security] 
possible—as it was during the two world wars and, on a regional 
basis, in the Cold War. But in the vast majority of cases—and in 
nearly all of the difficult ones—the nations of the world tend to 
disagree either about the nature of the threat or about the type of 
sacrifice they are prepared to make to meet it.
74
 
Given these coordination challenges, ISL violations are marshaled as 
evidence of the violator’s threatening intentions. Even where the 
international community as a whole fails to coordinate a response, 
alliances coordinate for security, and individual states allocate their own 
resources, in response to the focal point of threat. 
In 1960, game theorist Thomas Schelling defined a “focal point” as a 
“clue for coordinating behavior”—“each person’s expectation of what the 
 
 
 73. See Miller, supra note 7, at 54–55 (“[I]f a potential ally has behaved aggressively in the past 
(that is, dragging an ally into an unwanted war), then fears of entrapment will be higher.”). 
 74. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 53 (1994). Not coincidentally, Kissinger excepts the major 
conflicts of the twentieth-century—including those that postdate the emergence of modern 
international law—from his rule that states tend to disagree about the nature of the threat and whether 
(or how) to coordinate a response.  
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other expects him to expect to be expected to do.”75 Schelling explained 
that where states’ interests were aligned, “cheap talk” would suffice to 
create focal points of coordination; however, where there is a mixture of 
conflict and common interest, cheap talk is no longer sufficient to solve 
the coordination problem due to the distributive issues involved.
76
 
Schelling’s solution in such “mixed motive” games was to interpose a 
third party mediator: “When there is no apparent focal point for 
agreement, [the mediator] can create one by his power to make a dramatic 
suggestion,” which becomes, de facto, the most salient compromise 
option.
77
 Schelling illustrated the focal point phenomenon with the image 
of a bystander jumping into a jammed intersection to direct traffic.
78
 The 
bystander “is conceded the power to discriminate among cars by being 
able to offer a sufficient increase in efficiency to benefit even the cars 
most discriminated against; his directions have only the power of 
suggestion, but coordination requires the common acceptance of some 
source of suggestion.”79 
Building upon Schelling’s work, legal scholars have hypothesized that 
law provides a focal point for coordinating behavior.
80
 In Schelling’s 
example, law would be analogous to the installation of a traffic light. 
When the traffic light is red, the law expresses a highly visible signal that 
the driver is expected to stop. Even in the absence of a police officer to 
sanction violators, it is often more efficient to coordinate by following the 
law’s signals, and drivers ignore those signals at their peril.81  
International law scholars have often suggested that a treaty’s 
substance provides focal points expressing to states how to coordinate in a 
given issue area.
82
 In addition, Christopher Whytock has identified a 
 
 
 75. SCHELLING, supra note 9, at 57. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
 77. Id. at 144. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1651 (2000) (suggesting that, in addition to its sanctioning function, law has an expressive 
function).  
 81. See id. at 1652 (“[The] proclamation—‘Drive on the right’—even one that carries no threat 
of sanctions, may cause people to drive on the right just because the proclamation makes everyone 
expect that others will drive on the right.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 265, 266 (2002) (“International law can provide a focal point for solving coordination 
problems.”); Geoffrey Garret & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the 
European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE 173 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993) (analyzing the European 
internal market in terms of expressive legal focal points); see also Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 47, 
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possible “second approach emphasiz[ing] the role of focal points in 
coordinating cooperation among prospective decentralized enforcers of 
public law.”83 Barry Weingast explored such a focal point enforcement 
theory in the context of constitutional law, but this approach has not been 
as well developed in international law scholarship.
84
 Whytock found only 
a passing comment in the international law literature regarding focal 
points generated by the violation of international law: “Individuals and 
groups can zero in on international court decisions as focal points around 
which to mobilize . . . .”85 In the absence of international court decisions, 
states make independent evaluations of the legality of other states’ actions 
and argue their cases through media or diplomatic channels, or in internal 
deliberations, zeroing in on international law violations as focal points of 
threat. 
For an example of a focal point resulting from the violation of 
international law, one needs to look no further than Guzman’s analysis of 
the reputational costs of violating a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”): 
Even in the absence of an international legal commitment . . . a 
decision to expropriate will have a chilling effect on future 
investments. To the extent that investors view the legal obligation 
contained in the BIT as a credible commitment, however, the 
country becomes more attractive to investors and may enjoy higher 
levels of investment. If expropriation undermines this confidence, a 
 
 
at 1134 (explaining the origins of customary international law norms in terms of focal point 
coordination). 
 83. Christopher A. Whytock, Thinking Beyond the Domestic-International Divide: Toward a 
Unified Concept of Public Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 155, 178–79 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 179 (noting that “the same logic would seem to apply” to focal points in international 
law) (citing Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 245 (1997)). 
 85. Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute 
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 478 (2000); see also Steinberg & 
Zasloff, supra note 45, at 80 (“Law and legal institutions could make the transgression of a clear rule 
transparent, serve as a source of credible commitment by powerful states, and establish focal points for 
coordination.” (citations omitted)). Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz have also shown how, 
in the domestic setting, it is more efficient for legislators to monitor regulatory agencies by using “fire 
alarms” instead of “police patrols.” Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional 
Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 168 (1984). The 
same logic would apply equally well in international law: where police patrols are impractical for 
reasons of sovereignty, international norms can nonetheless serve as fire alarms. In this way, “much of 
the [oversight] cost is borne by the citizens and interest groups who sound alarms” rather than by states 
themselves. Id.; see also DANIEL DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY REGIMES 70 (2007) (referring to the potential “fire alarm” and “focal point” functions of 
international NGOs). “Fire alarms” are another way to conceptualize security threat focal points. 
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portion of the lost investment can be attributed to a reputational 
effect resulting from the violation of international law.
86
 
This “reputational effect” perceived by private investors is distinguishable 
from either direct sanctions or treaty exclusion. Guzman is articulating the 
costs incurred when a state undermines its previously signaled restraint, 
here in the context of IEL. 
While occasionally providing mechanisms for direct sanctions (a 
function BITs happen to perform uniquely well), treaties more often serve 
as a device by which states pre-commit to elevating the prominence of 
specific threatening acts. In this way, international law makes credible the 
restraint promised when states bind themselves to international 
institutions. International law ensures that other states will be able to zero 
in on defection from those institutions. In the BIT example, because 
individual investors lack perfect information, treaty violations help 
identify threats by spotlighting certain previously identified acts that 
threaten investors most. Having focused on one threatening violation, 
investors will also question the state’s commitment to the rule of law 
moving forward. Thus, the potential for reputational costs in the 
investment market serves as a deterrent to BIT defections. Partly for 
investors, but especially for states—which must coordinate more closely 
against security threats—international law is a key source of focal points. 
Noncompliance is not the only source of security threat focal points. 
Walt identifies four factors that determine the level of security threat that a 
state poses: “1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) offensive capability; 
and 4) offensive intentions. . . . Perceptions of intent play an especially 
crucial role in alliance choices.”87 Unlike with aggregate power, 
proximity, and offensive capability, states always exercise free will over 
their intentions. Given the information asymmetries inherent in world 
politics, however, states are not always successful in communicating their 
allegedly peaceful intentions.
88
 By binding themselves to international 
institutions, states more effectively signal restraint. The successful 
communication of restraint reduces perceptions of threat and adverse 
 
 
 86. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1852 n.113. 
    87. Walt, supra note 8, at 9, 12 (“[A]ggregate power [refers to] a state’s total resources (i.e., 
population, industrial and military capability, technological prowess, etc.).”). Walt also predicted that 
“[p]erceptions of intent will be[come] increasingly important, because the distribution of capabilities 
will be more equal and geography may not offer clear guidance.” STEPHEN M. WALT, ORIGINS OF 
ALLIANCES vii (Cornell Univ. Press 1987). 
 88. “Determining intentions is not easy. Accordingly, statesmen often seek shortcuts to identify 
friends and foes.” WALT, supra note 87, at 180. 
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balancing strategies, and allows for welfare-maximizing opportunities.
89
 
Defection from such institutions has the opposite effect—increasing 
perceptions of threat and adverse balancing strategies, and reducing 
welfare-maximizing opportunities. “In a balancing world, policies that 
demonstrate restraint and benevolence are best.”90 
In addition to highly visible violations of international law, there are 
other forms of evidence of threatening intentions.
91
 As suggested above, 
beneath the formal legal violation, often the underlying act is also 
evidence of threat. For example, the use of force by the United States in 
Iraq in 2003 has often been described as illegal.
92
 Even assuming that the 
use of force had been legal, the fact that the United States exhibited the 
offensive intention and capability to invade a Middle Eastern nation would 
still signal a security threat to some other states. 
Nonetheless, ceteris paribus, the legal use of force will generally be 
perceived as far less threatening than the illegal use of force because it 
does not signal defection from the international security regime. An ISL 
violation (1) shines a spotlight on the threat of the underlying action, 
(2) creates the threatening perception that the state does not intend to be 
bound by the restraints to which it previously committed, and 
(3) facilitates international coordination in identifying and responding to 
the threat. With information regarding rivals’ strategic aims largely 
hidden, the conscious commission of an illegal act is an objective and 
vivid indicator of threatening intentions. Violations of ISL are perceived 
as provocative and often result in costly strategic balancing. 
C. Security Threat Focal Point Theory Summarized 
In summary, contemporary international relations theorists have shown 
that states tend to “balance” against threats and “bandwagon” with less 
threatening powers. Yet states face difficulties in determining which 
 
 
 89. See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 45, at 79 (noting that institutionalists like Keohane have 
demonstrated how “international institutions could reduce transaction and information costs,” leading 
to information sharing that “favors cooperation, reduces uncertainty about intentions, and facilitates 
international stability”). 
 90. Walt, supra note 8, at 14. 
 91. For example, Brewster writes that the “refusal to take on legal obligations—rather than the 
violation of international law—might do much more to influence the popular perception of the state 
than violations of legal obligations do.” Brewster, supra note 4, at 238–39 (citing George W. Bush’s 
refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol and “unsigning” of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court). Indeed, a state’s refusal to bind itself to an institution in the first place, or its decision to legally 
withdraw later, could constitute a separate security threat focal point. 
 92. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Use of Force in Iraq: Illegal and Illegitimate, 98 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 262 (2004). 
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security threats warrant the allocation of their scarce resources, especially 
in multipolar eras when power is dispersed. Rational states confronting a 
compliance decision must account for varying perceptions of threat due to 
other states’ imperfect information (and perhaps imperfect rationality). 
Noncompliance with ISL produces focal points of threat, making salient 
the violator’s lack of restraint, and facilitating international coordination in 
response. As explored in Part IV, such noncompliance focal points have 
historically led to strategic costs: (1) adverse alliance formation, (2) rivals’ 
increased armament, and (3) the denial of informal cooperation. These 
strategic reputational costs are potentially much higher than the cost of 
treaty exclusion because they jeopardize the violator’s security interests. In 
short, ISL violations spotlight threatening defections from international 
security institutions, leading to significant strategic reputational costs as 
states balance against the unrestrained violator. 
IV. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF STRATEGIC REPUTATIONAL COSTS 
This section applies the theory of security threat focal points to major 
conflicts and alliance formations over the course of the past century in 
order to test its explanatory power. The subsections below provide initial 
analyses of the role of international law in (a) threat perception in the run-
up to World Wars I and II in multipolar Europe, (b) the bipolar “balance of 
threat” during the Cold War, (c) security coordination successes and 
failures during unipolarity, and (d) threat perceptions during the return to 
multipolarity and the Chinese model of maximizing relative power while 
minimizing relative threat. Several of these historical episodes clearly 
support the theory, while others that might seem to contradict it at first 
blush are ultimately reconcilable. 
A. Multipolarity: Early Twentieth-Century Europe 
Prior to the twentieth century, European elites viewed war as sport, and 
ISL generally consisted of unrestrictive codes of honor and theological 
justifications for war.
93
 The Great War spurred an era of ambitious ISL 
projects, most of which failed before the UN Charter was adopted after 
World War II. Nonetheless, even rudimentary ISL norms played some role 
 
 
 93. See STANIMIR A. ALEXANDROV, SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (1996) (“The 18th and the 19th century were dominated by an unrestricted 
right of war and the recognition of conquests . . . .”). 
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in shaping perceptions of threat and strategic behavior in early twentieth-
century Europe. 
1. World War I: Before Bright Lines 
In the years leading up to World War I, Europe divided itself into the 
competing coalitions of the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The 
Triple Entente was formed due, in part, to perceptions of Germany’s 
expansionist intentions.
94
 In a famous 1907 memorandum, British 
diplomat Sir Eyre Crowe pondered the key strategic question of his day—
“whether Germany is in fact aiming at a political hegemony”: 
 Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political 
hegemony and maritime ascendancy, threatening the independence 
of her neighbours . . . ;  
 Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition . . . is 
[merely] seeking to promote her foreign commerce . . . . 
. . . .  
 . . . [S]o long as Germany’s action does not overstep the line of 
legitimate protection of existing rights she can always count upon 
the sympathy and good-will[,] and even the moral support, of 
England.
95
 
Crowe grappled for the “real advantage” he saw in making “as patent and 
pronounced [and] as authoritative as possible” the distinction between 
peaceful German expansion and unrestrained expansion, which would 
meet “determined opposition.”96 Yet the “line of legitimate protection of 
existing rights” traced by European diplomats proved too vague to restrain 
the rise of Germany as a military threat and the expectations of conflict 
that accompanied it.
97
 
Crowe was searching for a pre-delineated security threat focal point, or, 
in other words, an international norm. But, in the absence of meaningful 
use of force restrictions or arms controls (much less a collective security 
 
 
 94. Walt, supra note 8, at 12 (“Although the growth of German power played a major role, the 
importance of German intentions should not be ignored.”). 
 95. Eyre Crowe, Memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on the Present State of British Relations with 
France and Germany, in BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, VOLUME III: THE 
TESTING OF THE ENTENTE 397, 403, 417 (G.P. Gooch & Harold Temerley eds., 1928). 
 96. Id. at 418. 
 97. Id. at 417. 
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organization),
98
 there was little role for international law to play in 
spotlighting threat or deterring war. Indeed, the most relevant international 
agreements in the years leading up to 1914 constituted not a set of 
international norms, but an intricate framework of hair-trigger alliances 
that helped plunge Europe deep into war.
99
  
Nonetheless, “it appears that the critical trigger for cabinet approval of 
British intervention in the early stages of the war was the German 
violation of Belgian neutrality”—much to the surprise of Germany, which 
had expected Britain to remain neutral.
100
 Even across the Atlantic, 
perceptions of German noncompliance with respect to the narrow issue of 
Belgian neutrality would “exert a profound impact upon the evolution of 
the U.S. government’s neutrality policy into a stance of ‘benevolent 
neutrality’ in favor of the Allies and against the Central Powers.”101 
Moreover, Germany’s noncompliance with the customary laws of 
maritime warfare had a “decisive impact upon American public opinion 
and governmental decision-making processes” from 1915 to 1917, when 
the United States finally entered the war.
102
 Unfortunately, the British and 
American reactions to the German threat came too late to prevent 
disaster.
103
 
Prior to World War I, meaningful treaty restrictions on the use of force 
or the European arms race were the exception rather than the rule. Far 
from being viewed as defections from the international order, the arms 
race and the use of force appeared inevitable.
104
 In an international order 
with few bright line rules, expectations of conflict accompanied the rise of 
unified Germany and became a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
2. World War II: “The Lesson of Munich” 
The well-known story of appeasement might appear to contradict the 
security threat focal point theory. Instead of balancing against Germany in 
 
 
 98. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 26–27 (“The first significant step, designed to curtail the 
freedom of war in general international law, was the creation of the League of Nations [following 
World War I].”). 
 99. In addition to their complexity and frequent secrecy, some of these alliance commitments 
required the preemptive mobilization of armies, while others pledged to stand behind the aggressive 
use of force. See KISSINGER, supra note 74, at 203, 209.  
 100. Jack S. Levy, The Role of Necessary Conditions in the Outbreak of World War I, in 
EXPLAINING WAR AND PEACE: CASE STUDIES AND NECESSARY CONDITION COUNTERFACTUALS 47, 
66 (Gary Goertz & Jack S. Levy eds., 2007). 
 101. FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, WORLD POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1985).  
 102. Id. at 49. 
 103. See KISSINGER, supra note 74, at 212.  
 104. See id. at 194. 
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the wake of its international law violations, the rest of Europe initially 
sought to placate the coercive state. Yet these coordination failures were 
attributable primarily to the incoherence and obsolescence of the 
international law that Hitler initially violated. High strategic costs later 
resulted from his violation of the unambiguous Munich Agreement. 
From 1933 to 1938, Germany violated its commitments under the 
Treaty of Versailles by rearming, remilitarizing the Rhineland, and 
occupying Austria. Although Britain and France complained, they failed to 
coordinate an effective response.
105
 When ethnic Germans rebelled in the 
Sudetenland in 1938, the British and French pressured Czechoslovakia to 
surrender the region to appease Hitler.
106
 Britain, France, Germany, and 
Italy formalized this arrangement without Czechoslovakia in the Munich 
Agreement of September 1938.
107
 When Hitler defected and invaded all of 
Czechoslovakia six months later, Britain and France failed to directly 
sanction Germany.
108
 No longer naïve to Hitler’s offensive intentions, 
however, Britain reacted to the Munich Agreement violation by pledging 
to defend Poland against the German threat.
109
 Hitler invaded Poland on 
September 1, 1939, and two days later Britain and France declared war.  
Drawing on Mercer’s social psychology research, Daryl Press argues 
that the so-called “lesson of Munich”—that appeasement leads to a loss of 
the credibility necessary for deterrence—is premised on a flawed belief 
that states predict rivals’ future behavior on the basis of their past 
actions.
110
 Because Mercer and Press focus exclusively on deterrence 
theory, they overgeneralize from the finding that it “is wrong to believe 
that a state’s reputation for resolve is worth fighting for” to the broad 
conclusion that the “belief in the importance of reputation is premised on 
a mistaken view of how people tend to explain behavior.”111   
 
 
 105. Daryl G. Press, The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the “Appeasement” 
Crises of the 1930s, 29 INT’L SEC. 136, 136 (2005). 
 106. Id. at 150. 
 107. KISSINGER, supra note 74, at 313–14. 
 108. Id. 
 109. France was already bound to defend Poland by a 1921 treaty. Press, supra note 105, at 158. 
 110. Id. at 136, 138. Press’s findings “complement and extend Mercer’s,” and his focus is also 
limited to states’ reputations for resolve in the context of deterrence theory. Id. at 140 n.12. 
 111. MERCER, supra note 36, at 1 (emphasis added); see also Miller, supra note 7, at 41 (“I 
suggest that Mercer’s findings, though important, are incomplete. States, like firms, have many 
different kinds of reputations, and the emphasis on resolve does not account for the variety of other 
reputations that are attributed to a state.”). 
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Mercer had applied social psychology to international relations, 
showing that: 
When a decision-maker’s policies work (meaning that an ally or 
adversary behaves “desirably”), this response only shows these 
policies caused that behavior. When his policies fail to elicit 
desirable behavior, this failure is taken not as a weakness of his 
policy, but as a reflection on whomever is messing up his plans.
112
  
In other words: 
  “Undesirable behavior  dispositional attribution 
  Desirable behavior  situational attribution”113 
For an adversary, lack of resolve is a desirable behavior, so one would 
expect to find a tendency toward situational attributions to explain an 
adversary’s lack of resolve.114 Press’s research confirms that “German 
discussions about the credibility of their adversaries emphasized the 
balance of power [i.e., the situation], not their history of keeping or 
breaking commitments [i.e., their disposition].”115 Thus, reputation may be 
of minimal significance in the context of deterrence—unlike with rivals’ 
violations of international law, which are almost always undesirable and 
would be expected to disproportionately trigger dispositional attributions. 
More important for present purposes are the failures of the British and 
French to respond to the security threat focal points provided by Hitler’s 
initial violations of international law. Germany’s rearmament, 
remilitarization of the Rhineland, and annexation of Austria are all 
examples of undesirable behavior. Social psychology theory predicts that 
Germany’s adversaries would have attributed to it an offensive disposition 
(in this case, rationally). But with the horrors of World War I fresh in their 
minds, the British and French leadership in 1938 sought to avoid war “at 
almost any cost.”116  
This initial coordination failure may be ascribed, in part, to the 
incoherence of the era’s international norms. Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points embraced the slippery ideal of self-determination,
117
 and the “gaps” 
 
 
 112. MERCER, supra note 36, at 62–63.  
 113. Id. at 63.  
 114. See id. at 62. 
 115. Press, supra note 105, at 138. 
 116. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, BARGAINING WITH THE DEVIL: WHEN TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN TO 
FIGHT 85 (2010). 
 117. Due to the principle of self-determination and their historical ties, “the union of Germany and 
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in the Covenant of the League of Nations, as well as the non-participation 
of the United States, undermined collective security.
118
 Most importantly, 
the 1919 Treaty of Versailles—requiring Germany to accept sole 
responsibility for World War I, pay exorbitant reparations, and make 
substantial territorial concessions—was obsolete by the 1930s.119 
According to Guzman: 
[M]any western European nations had come to see the Treaty of 
Versailles as unnecessarily harsh and punitive, and had higher 
expectations of Germany’s compliance with the Munich 
[Agreement]. So it was the violation of the latter agreement that 
caused the collapse of Germany’s reputation and prompted the 
British and French to issue the March 1939 guarantee of Polish 
security against German aggression.
120
 
Again, Guzman articulates a reputational cost distinguishable from either a 
direct sanction or treaty exclusion. Here, Britain and France coordinated to 
defend a third party’s security in reaction to a threat signaled by a treaty 
violation.  
Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in international law preceding the 
Munich Agreement, in 1936 Winston Churchill reacted to the 
remilitarization of the Rhineland by calling for a “pact among the western 
states, Holland, Belgium, France, and Britain for mutual aid in the event of 
unprovoked attack, and for keeping in being a force great enough to deter 
Germany from making such an attack.”121 As early as 1933, “Churchill 
told his constituents, ‘There is grave reason to believe that Germany is 
arming herself, or seeking to arm herself, contrary to the solemn treaties 
extracted from her in her hour of defeat.’”122 Again in 1938, Churchill 
 
 
Austria had about it that sense of ambiguity so essential to the success of Hitler’s early challenges.” 
KISSINGER, supra note 74, at 310. 
 118. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 33 (“The most serious gap was probably Article 15 (7) 
allowing States to go to war if the Council failed to adopt an unanimous report.”). 
 119. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 21, at 103 (“[M]any treaties are mistakes or are quickly 
rendered irrelevant by rapidly changing international relations. . . . The treaties of Versailles and 
Sèvres at the end of World War I are only the most obvious examples.”). 
 120. GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 112. 
 121. Donald Cameron Watt, Churchill and Appeasement, in CHURCHILL: A MAJOR NEW 
ASSESSMENT OF HIS LIFE IN PEACE AND WAR 205 (Robert Blake & William Roger Louis eds., 2002). 
 122. MARTIN GILBERT, CHURCHILL: A LIFE 522 (1991). Churchill’s warning came only a month 
after the distribution within the British government of “a secret memorandum setting out the evidence 
that Germany had begun to build military aircraft in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.” Id. at 521. 
The previous year, in 1932, Churchill supported British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon’s official 
note stating that the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were still binding upon Germany. 
Churchill “argued that Simon’s firm stand had ‘done more to consolidate peace in Europe than any 
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repeated his call for a strategic alliance to balance against the German 
threat, in response to Germany’s annexation of Austria and the 
Czechoslovakian crisis.
123
 Nonetheless, British Foreign Secretary Lord 
Halifax “drew a distinction between ‘Germany’s racial efforts’ (i.e. the 
support of the Sudeten Germans) ‘which none could question’ and a ‘lust 
for conquest on a Napoleonic scale’ with which presumably Churchill 
credited Hitler but which Halifax himself ‘did not credit.’”124 
The lesson of Munich is that the appeasers were late in coordinating 
around the security threat focal points generated by Hitler’s violations of 
the era’s (admittedly equivocal) international norms. While Churchill saw 
the need to coordinate balancing strategies after the initial ISL violations 
betrayed Hitler’s intentions, Lord Halifax and Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain did not.  
Guzman draws a different lesson from Munich and its aftermath. For 
him, “Nazi Germany had no reason to value a good reputation.”125 Since 
“Hitler’s ambitions required that he ignore international legal norms,” it 
was pointless for him to cultivate a reputation for compliance.
126
 In other 
words, since Germany could not have expected to conclude treaties with 
other states and simultaneously conquer Europe, “the harm to Germany’s 
reputation as a result of its violation of the Munich [Agreement] imposed 
only a modest cost on the state.”127 For Guzman, the important lesson is 
that “when states have honest concerns about fundamental security 
interest[s] . . . international law is unlikely to have much influence on their 
decisions.”128 
Yet Guzman had earlier concluded that Hitler’s Munich Agreement 
violation “caused the collapse of Germany’s reputation and prompted the 
British and French to issue the March 1939 guarantee of Polish security 
against German aggression.”129 An opposing security alliance is a 
significant cost, especially for a state poised to go to war against one of its 
 
 
words spoken on behalf of Great Britain for some years’. Simon had ‘raised the hand of warning in the 
interests of peace’.” Id. at 509. 
 123. Watt, supra note 121, at 205 (“Churchill advocated an Anglo-French alliance and a joint 
effort to persuade the states of central Europe and the Balkans to unite against Hitler . . . .”). 
 124. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting another source); cf. Joffe, supra note 61, at 14 (“Hardly had 
the Versailles Treaty been sealed in 1919 when Britain returned to its older strategy of balancing 
against France, even though the real threat emanated from revisionist Germany.”). 
 125. GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 111. 
 126. Id. To the extent that Guzman is suggesting (with good reason) that Hitler was not engaging 
in rational decision-making, a rational Germany might nonetheless have forecast that noncompliance 
would result in high strategic reputational costs. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 112–13. 
 129. Id. at 112. 
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members. If Germany’s earlier international law violations resulted in only 
modest costs, then it was due to the obsolescence of the Treaty of 
Versailles combined with the appeasers’ lack of resolve. Instead of 
coordinating around the focal points of Hitler’s noncompliance with 
international law, Britain initially coordinated around his racial rhetoric 
with respect to the Sudetenland.
130
 In retrospect, the central lesson of 
Munich was the rationality of coordinating for collective defense around 
the more objective ISL violations. Another lesson is the need to have on 
hand ISL norms that accurately flag those actions that states consider 
threatening. When critical ISL norms become obsolete, timely security 
coordination is more difficult to achieve. 
B. Bipolarity: Cold War Threat Perception and International Law 
During the Cold War, even with only two poles of great power, 
international law still played an important role as generator of security 
threat focal points. This was true in the contexts of both (1) multilateral 
alliance formation, and (2) bilateral U.S.-Soviet relations. 
1. Alliance Formation 
 
International relations scholars have shown that critical industrialized 
states in Europe and Asia opted to balance against the Soviet Union and 
bandwagon with the United States, thereby tipping the Cold War balance 
of power in favor of the United States. An analysis of Cold War 
noncompliance helps explain the threat perceptions that drove such 
alliance formation. 
a. Cold War Balancing Against Security Threat 
In the bipolar era of the Cold War, grave security threats were 
somewhat easier to identify. In order to maintain its edge in the balance of 
power, the United States needed only to be perceived by key allies as less 
threatening than the Soviet Union. In his influential 1985 article, Alliance 
Formation and the Balance of World Power, Professor Walt showed that 
the global “balance of threat” explained why the balance of power greatly 
favored the United States and did not self-correct despite an “imbalance of 
power.”131 
 
 
 130. See supra text accompanying note 124. 
 131. Walt, supra note 8, at 33. For example, in 1982 the Soviet alliance network accounted for 
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Walt analyzed alliance formation in the global North and South and 
found opposite results. In the North, for the medium powers of Western 
Europe and Asia, the United States was the perfect ally—sufficiently 
powerful to ensure their defense, yet sufficiently distant to pose a lesser 
threat itself.
132
 In contrast, Soviet relations with those states were more 
hostile.
133
 In addition to threatening the medium powers of Europe and 
Asia due to its proximity, perceptions of its offensive intentions also 
worked against the Soviets: 
Actions like the invasion of Afghanistan, periodic interventions in 
Eastern Europe, support for terrorist organizations and 
revolutionary movements abroad, all reinforce global opposition to 
the Soviet Union. Although these actions may attract the support of 
radical forces around the globe, they have also increased the already 
strong tendency for the world’s wealthiest and most stable regimes 
to ally together for mutual defense.
134
 
In the South, however, Walt found these factors reversed, explaining why 
the Soviets attracted more allies there.
135
 Since the Soviet capacity for 
global power projection was distinctly inferior to that of the United States, 
the United States was more “proximate” and more disposed to intervene in 
the South.  
Walt concluded: “Thus where Soviet power and perceived intentions 
threatened the developed world but not the former colonies, American 
power and American actions did just the opposite. U.S. interventionism in 
the developing world drove more Third World regimes to the Soviet side 
than it attracted to its own.”136 Because the balance of threat resulted in the 
medium powers of the industrialized world allying with the United States 
and the poorer third world countries allying with the Soviets, the global 
balance of power greatly favored the United States.
137
  
 
 
only 12.4% of world population, 19.3% of world GNP, and 39.7% of world defense spending. Id. at 
42. Meanwhile, the American alliance network accounted for 27.7% of world population, 62.8% of 
world GNP, and 46.5% of world defense spending. Id. at 43. See also Nye, supra note 8, at 557 
(“Europe and Japan allied with the Americans because the Soviet Union, while weaker in overall 
power, posed a greater military threat . . . .”). 
 132. Walt, supra note 8, at 36. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 37. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 38 (emphasis omitted). 
 137. Id. at 33–34, 37. 
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b. Cold War Noncompliance and Threat Perception 
The conclusion of World War II produced a series of important 
international agreements, noncompliance with which became a key driver 
of postwar alliance formation. By 1949, Western Europe and the United 
States had created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”).138 
The powerful NATO allies were united by their perception of the Soviet 
Union’s threatening intentions, based at least partly on a pattern of Soviet 
violations of international agreements. 
Although the Cold War lasted over four decades, the fundamental 
alliance system was effectively determined during its first four years. “Not 
long after the Yalta Conference—when the Russians forced a Communist 
government on Rumania”—the erstwhile Allies “began to awaken to the 
unpleasant truth.”139 Soon it was the popular belief “that the Russians had 
treacherously broken their wartime agreements.”140 Although no treaties 
had been concluded at the Teheran, Yalta, or Potsdam conferences, the Big 
Three (the U.S., U.S.S.R., and U.K.) did agree to formal declarations of 
intentions.
141
 While such “soft law” commitments “do not represent a 
complete pledge of a nation’s reputational capital,” Guzman argues that “a 
failure to honor the terms of such an agreement is not costless.”142 Indeed, 
costly focal points arise when a state fails to perform the formal 
commitments that it has put in writing for the world to see. This is 
especially true in the security context where states are highly sensitive to 
threats.  
After World War II, the West coordinated around instantly 
recognizable Soviet violations as an iron curtain descended across Europe 
in contradiction to the declared Soviet intentions. For example, Yalta’s 
Declaration on Liberated Europe emphasized “the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live . . . .”143 The 
United States also obtained formal Soviet commitments to political 
 
 
 138. North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force on Aug. 24, 1949). 
 139. Richard W. Van Alstyne, The United States and Russia, in THE COLD WAR: A CONFLICT OF 
IDEOLOGY AND POWER 46 (Norman A. Graebner ed., 2d ed. 1976). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Guzman, supra note 3, at 1879–80 (defining soft law as “promises made by states 
through instruments that fall short of full-scale treaties, such as memoranda of understanding, 
executive agreements, nonbinding treaties, joint declarations, final communiqués, agreements pursuant 
to legislation, and so on”). 
 143. Melvyn P. Leffler, Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold 
War, 11 INT’L SEC. 88, 101 (1986) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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openness in Korea and Iran.
144
 Such declarations were more than human 
rights commitments; they were also guarantees that Western democracies 
would retain a strategic foothold in the newly liberated states.
145
  
The Truman administration’s perception of—and reaction to—
provocative Soviet noncompliance is particularly well documented. In 
1946, “Truman lost faith in the Kremlin” and ordered his Special Counsel, 
Clark Clifford, to assess Soviet compliance.
146
 Clifford later described the 
assignment as a result of Truman’s disillusionment with attempts to 
cooperate with the Soviets: 
At th[e Potsdam] conference, President Truman and Premier Stalin 
developed a mutual regard for each other and a relationship. The 
President had real hopes that under the leadership and cooperation 
of the United States and the Soviet Union a way could be found to 
bring peace to the world.  
 . . . . 
 . . . The Soviets did not keep a promise made at Potsdam, as I 
remember. They broke other agreements we had. They were just 
scraps of paper to them.
147
 
Clifford and his assistant, George Elsey, “wrote a devastating critique 
of Soviet adherence to wartime and postwar agreements.”148 After 
describing in detail Soviet noncompliance with a number of agreements, 
“they went on to attribute Soviet actions to Marxist-Leninist ideology, to 
claim that the Soviets sought world domination, and to recommend 
 
 
 144. See infra p.703 and notes 152–53. 
 145. See Leffler, supra note 143, at 117 (“The Yalta agreements provided a convenient lever to try 
to pry open Eastern Europe and to resist Soviet predominance . . . .”). 
 146. Id. at 88. 
 147. Interview with Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, 372–74 (Mar. 16, 1972) 
(transcript available in the Harry S. Truman Library), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/ 
oralhist/cliford.htm.  
 148. Leffler, supra note 143, at 88 (citing the Clifford-Elsey memorandum in ARTHUR KROCK, 
MEMOIRS: SIXTY YEARS ON THE FIRING LINE app. A (1968)). According to Krock, the memorandum 
“was a fundamentally important American state paper” because it supplied Truman with a summary of 
the wartime relationship with the Soviet Union and “charted the postwar prospect with startling 
prescience in which the shape and thrust of Truman’s subsequent great programs—the Greek-Turk aid 
legislation, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Alliance (including NATO), and what later became 
known as the ‘Truman Doctrine’—were outlined.” KROCK, at 224. Krock, the “Dean of the 
Washington newsmen,” went so far as to claim that “[i]f Truman had been equipped with this 
Memorandum in May and June of 1945 . . . the Cold War, in the degree of intensity to which it grew, 
might have been averted” because Truman might not have committed his “greatest error” of 
prematurely demobilizing American forces after World War II. Id. at 223, 234. 
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adoption of a series of measures to assist prospective allies, augment 
American strength, and redress the balance of power.”149 
Clifford, as Truman’s Special Counsel, structured the memorandum as 
if it were a persuasive legal brief. The opening “Outline of the Report” 
summarized its main arguments—striking examples of dispositional 
attributions explicitly drawn from “Violations of Soviet Agreements with 
the United States”: 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... Page 1 
 a.  Our ability to resolve the present conflict between Soviet and 
American foreign policies may determine whether there is to be a 
permanent peace or a third World War. 
 b. U.S. policy toward the U.S.S.R. will be greatly affected by the 
extent of our knowledge of Soviet policies [i.e., intentions] and 
activities. A forecast of Soviet future policy toward this country can 
be based on the manner in which the U.S.S.R. has maintained her 
agreements with this country, and on recent Soviet activities which 
vitally affect the security of the United States. 
CHAPTER I: Soviet Foreign Policy ........................................ Page 3 
 a.  Soviet leaders believe that a conflict is inevitable between the 
U.S.S.R. and capitalist states, and their duty is to prepare the Soviet 
Union for this conflict. 
 b. The aim of current Soviet policy is to prepare for the ultimate 
conflict by increasing Soviet power as rapidly as possible and by 
weakening all nations who may be considered hostile. 
 c. Soviet activities throughout the world . . . are in support of 
this policy of increasing the relative power of the Soviet Union at 
the expense of her potential enemies. 
CHAPTER II: Soviet-American Agreements, 1942–1946 ..... Page 15 
 a.  By means of written agreements reached at international 
conferences, the United States Government has sought to lessen the 
differences between this country and the U.S.S.R. . . . . 
 . . . . 
  
 
 
 149. Leffler, supra note 143, at 88. 
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CHAPTER III: Violations of Soviet Agreements with the United 
States  ..................................................................................... Page 27 
 a.  Soviet-American agreements have been adhered to, 
“interpreted,” or violated as Soviet officials from time to time have 
considered it to be in the best interests of the Soviet Union in 
accordance with Soviet policy of increasing their own power at the 
expense of other nations.  
 b. A number of specific violations are described in detail. . . .
150
 
Clifford had requested reports on Soviet compliance and other 
activities from various agencies and then spent months compiling and 
summarizing that information with Elsey’s assistance.151 Their 
memorandum catalogued the varying degrees of Soviet noncompliance 
with fifteen agreements formally pronounced between 1942 and 1945.
152
 
They wrote that “[m]ost of these violations have concerned matters of vital 
interest to the United States,” and focused particular attention on 
“violations concern[ing] Germany, Austria, the Balkan countries, Iran, 
Korea and Lend-Lease agreements.”153  
 
 
 150. Memorandum from Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, to President Harry S. 
Truman, American Relations with the Soviet Union: A Report to the President by the Special Counsel 
to the President, at i–ii (Sept. 24, 1946) (emphasis added), available at http://www.trumanlibrary 
.org/4-1.pdf.  
 151. CLARK CLIFFORD, PERSONAL PAPERS, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., Box 
15. Clifford’s notes include memoranda alleging Soviet violations from, for example, the State 
Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and ambassadors. Among Clifford’s notes is a sixty-five-page 
ledger listing “Treat[ies]” alongside detailed assessments of Soviet compliance. Id. 
 152. The memorandum claimed that “the Soviet Union has violated in whole or in part”: The 
United Nations Declaration (Jan. 1, 1942), Principles Applying to Mutual Aid (June 11, 1942), The 
Declaration on Austria agreed upon at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (Oct. 1943), The 
Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran agreed upon at the Teheran Conference (Nov. 1943), 
Armistice Agreement with Rumania (Sept. 12, 1944), Armistice Agreement with Bulgaria (Oct. 28, 
1944), Armistice Agreement with Hungary (Jan. 20, 1945), The Declaration on Liberated Europe 
agreed upon at the Yalta Conference (Feb. 1945), Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany (June 
5, 1945), Charter of the United Nations (June 26, 1945), Agreement on Control Machinery in Austria 
(July 4, 1945), European Advisory Commission Agreement (July 9, 1945), The Potsdam Declaration 
(July 26, 1945), The Protocol and Report of the Berlin Conference (July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945), and the 
“Moscow agreement provid[ing] that [a] joint commission [would] assist in the formation of a 
Provisional Korean Government” agreed upon at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers (Dec. 
1945). Clifford, supra note 150, at 31–48. 
 153. Id. at 28, ii. For example, the memorandum cited Soviet refusals to hold free elections in 
liberated Europe as violations of the Yalta agreement, which were “particularly flagrant in relation to 
Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland.” Id. at 29. Beyond Europe, the memorandum also 
described Soviet noncompliance in Iran and Korea. Id. at 30 (“The refusal of the Soviet occupation 
forces in northern Iran to permit the Iranian Government to send reinforcements to Tabriz when faced 
with a secession movement in Azerbaijan was a violation of the Teheran declaration . . . .”). 
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The technical accuracy of Clifford’s legal arguments is not as 
important as their persuasive effect.
154
 The theory of Clifford’s case was 
that the Soviet Union refused to restrain itself through compliance with 
international agreements and therefore had to be restrained through 
strategic action. Had Soviet violations been clearer, or had it violated 
“hard law” instead of “soft law,” the resulting security threat focal points 
would have been even more glaring to the Truman administration.  
Having “forecast [the] Soviet[s’] future policy . . . based on the manner 
in which the U.S.S.R. has maintained her agreements”155—the very 
definition of reputation—the memorandum then offered a series of 
strategic recommendations. On the one hand, Clifford recommended a 
strong military posture to “restrain” and “confine” the Soviets: 
The United States . . . should entertain no proposal for disarmament 
or limitation of armament as long as the possibility of Soviet 
aggression exists. . . . In addition to maintaining our own strength, 
the United States should support and assist all democratic countries 
which are in any way menaced or endangered by the U.S.S.R. . . . . 
[T]he United States should maintain military forces powerful 
enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence 
to its present area.
156
 
On the other hand, Clifford stressed the importance of signaling that “the 
United States has no aggressive intentions” to its allies as well as to the 
Soviets.
157
 
 
 
 154. Historian Melvyn Leffler—placing primary emphasis on the negotiating history of the 
wartime agreements—argues that “the Soviet pattern of adherence was not qualitatively different from 
the American pattern; both governments complied with some accords and disregarded others.” Leffler, 
supra note 143, at 89. Yet Leffler concludes that Clifford, Elsey, and Truman “were convinced of 
Soviet duplicity and American innocence.” Id. at 90. Moreover, Leffler concedes that “Moscow’s 
refusal to ensure free elections and to establish representative governments constituted clear-cut 
violations of wartime agreements.” Id. at 103. “If any doubts persisted, the Soviet failure to withdraw 
Russian armies from northern Iran by March 2, 1946 appeared irrefutable proof of the Kremlin’s 
nefarious intentions.” Id. at 111. Even if American pressures on Portugal, Iceland, and Ecuador to 
renegotiate status of forces agreements, id. at 111–12, could be construed as counter to the spirit of 
U.S. wartime agreements and “endangering vital Soviet interests just as Soviet violations may have 
imperiled critical American interests,” id. at 89, Soviet violations went much further in endangering 
the security interests of the medium powers of Europe and Asia. 
 155. Clifford, supra note 150, at i.  
 156. Id. at 74, 75, 79 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. at 75–77 (“[The United States should] support the United Nations and all other 
organizations contributing to international understanding . . . distribute books, magazines, newspapers 
and movies among the Soviets, beam radio broadcasts to the U.S.S.R., and press for an exchange of 
tourists, students . . . and cultural contacts . . . .”). 
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Thus, the memorandum “contained the seeds of the Marshall plan, the 
seeds of NATO and the basic principles upon which the President relied 
for the Truman Doctrine,” which was announced only six months after 
Clifford submitted the memorandum to Truman in September 1946.
158
 
Soviet noncompliance was at the core of the dispositional attributions 
underpinning Truman’s seminal Cold War policies, imposing great 
strategic costs on the Soviets for decades to come. In the words of Elsey, 
Clifford’s assistant: 
The President . . . said he was concerned at the fact that the 
Russians couldn’t be trusted and didn’t keep agreements that they 
had made . . . . [T]he President seemed to be basing too much of his 
attitude towards the Russians at that point, on this rather narrow 
point of whether they did or did not adhere to agreements.
159
 
Elsey was surely correct that Soviet-American relations were a “more 
comprehensive, much broader, matter than this technicality of agreement 
breaking or agreement keeping.”160 With limited information upon taking 
power after Roosevelt’s death, however, President Truman naturally 
zeroed in on the Soviet violations as security threat focal points. 
Clifford and Elsey had undertaken a task similar to that of Sir Eyre 
Crowe less than forty years before them. But where Crowe had struggled 
to trace some “line of legitimate protection of existing rights” that 
Germany should not overstep, Clifford and Elsey did not have to look far 
for such a tripwire.
161
 The United States and the Soviet Union had 
formally agreed to declarations of intentions relating to grand strategy at 
the close of World War II. Though not the only evidence of the Soviet 
threat available in 1946, the repeated violation of those formal 
commitments served as the most salient focal point from the perspective of 
 
 
 158. Interview with Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to the President 80 (Apr. 13, 1971) (transcript 
available in the Harry S. Truman Library), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ 
cliford.htm. Clifford and Elsey had a hand in drafting Truman’s speech on March 12, 1947, portions of 
which came directly from their memorandum. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 545 (1992). That 
speech, announcing the Truman Doctrine, went too far for George Kennan. Id. at 546. Although 
Kennan’s “Long Telegram” predated the work of Clifford and Elsey, it was but “one of a number of 
inputs” they processed, and their strategic recommendations went much further than Kennan’s. 
Clifford, supra note 147, at 84–86. “Kennan’s was a lonely voice in opposition to NATO[, while] 
West Europeans craved reassurance against invasion” and most American officials viewed NATO as a 
bulwark against Soviet expansion. WALTER L. HIXON, GEORGE F. KENNAN: COLD WAR ICONOCLAST 
77 (1989).  
 159. Interview with George Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. 263 (Apr. 9, 
1970), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/elsey.htm.  
 160. Id. at 264. 
 161. Crowe, supra note 95, at 417. 
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Washington and as the impetus for balancing strategies of unprecedented 
scale. 
From the perspective of London, meanwhile, in another wartime 
agreement, Churchill had secretly traded Soviet preponderance in 
Romania and Bulgaria for British influence in Greece.
162
 In 1947, 
however, Britain was forced to withdraw its aid from both Greece and 
Turkey following a communist uprising in Greece and the Soviet Union’s 
denunciation of a Turco-Soviet nonaggression treaty.
163
 That same year, 
“claiming that the Soviets had not abided by a ‘single’ agreement, Truman 
insisted that he had to resort to ‘other methods’ and embarked on a policy 
of unrestrained competition.”164 In his 1947 address to Congress, the 
President announced the first hints of the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan, providing $400 million in aid for Greece and Turkey and a 
pledge to “assist free peoples,” while avoiding any threat of U.S. military 
intervention.
165
  
In contrast to the benevolent U.S. approach in Europe, the Soviet 
Union continued to threaten its neighbors to the west. The Soviets began 
to pressure Hungary’s government, rooting out so-called “fascists,” 
discovering conspiracies, and forcing resignations.
166
 In 1948, the same 
year it aggressively blockaded Berlin, the Soviet Union supported a coup 
in Czechoslovakia. Therefore, it was no surprise that 1949 witnessed the 
signing of the North Atlantic Treaty by the United States and the medium 
powers of Western Europe, creating an institution to defend the territorial 
integrity of its member states.
167
 Thus, the benefits of Soviet 
noncompliance in the late-1940s (i.e., maintaining control over its 
 
 
 162. J.P.D. DUNBABIN, THE COLD WAR: THE GREAT POWERS AND THEIR ALLIES 60 (1994).  
 163. See, e.g., Anne O’Hare McCormick, Abroad: In Peace as in War Turkey is at the 
Crossroads, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1946, at 11 (explaining that the Soviets now laid claim to the Turkish 
border districts of Kars and Ardahan, and “since the Soviet Government denounced its twenty-year 
treaty of friendship with Turkey last March, the question of Russia’s intentions toward the neighboring 
republic has clouded the international horizon . . . .”). Turkey became a key U.S. ally, building the 
second-largest NATO army. See Walt, supra note 8, at 43. 
 164. Leffler, supra note 143, at 122. 
 165. DUNBABIN, supra note 162, at 83. 
 166. Id. at 67. 
 167. See North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 138, art. 5 (“The Parties agree that an armed attack 
against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right 
of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the 
other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”). 
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satellites) must be weighed against the costs of the widespread perception 
of the Soviet threat (i.e., adverse balancing strategies).
168
 
The new “hard law” of the UN Charter also provided refined 
restrictions on the use of force, creating a much-improved mechanism for 
identifying threat.
169
 To reduce perceptions of its threatening intentions, 
the Soviet Union often sought a measure of legal ambiguity in its Eastern 
European interventions through the use of proxies. For example, in 1956 
when the Red Army invaded Budapest, Hungarian party leader Janos 
Kadar, having fled to the Soviet Union, announced the formation of a rival 
government and appealed to the Soviets to crush the forces of reaction.
170
 
The Soviets obliged, in a “blatant abuse of the right of collective self-
defense.”171 
“Another blatant example of illegal use of force” was the Soviet-led 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968:
172
 
Militarily the operation was a success, but politically it nearly 
miscarried. It had apparently meant to establish an emergency 
government, like Kadar’s in Hungary in 1956, that would appeal for 
intervention and then try [Communist Party Leader Alexander] 
Dubček as a saboteur of socialism; he was whisked off as a prisoner 
to the Soviet Union. No such government could be created; and the 
 
 
 168. Leffler describes the Soviets’ cost-benefit compliance analysis as follows: “On the one hand, 
compliance might moderate American suspicions, elicit American loans, and reap large reparation 
payments from the western zones of Germany; on the other hand, compliance might lead to the 
establishment of hostile governments on the Soviet periphery, risk the incorporation of a revived 
Germany into a British (or Anglo-American bloc), and arrogate the Kremlin and Eastern Europe to a 
position of financial and economic dependency.” Leffler, supra note 143 at 119–20. Perceptions of 
threat by the medium powers of Europe and Asia (and the associated strategic costs) must be added to 
the costs of Soviet noncompliance. See, e.g., Statements to Security Council on Czechoslovak Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1948, at 12 (citing Soviet violations of Yalta commitments in Romania, 
Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia when British representative to the UN 
Security Council Sir Alexander Cadogan alleged the Soviet Union was a “threat of overwhelming 
force”).  
 169. The 1949 Geneva Conventions also improved upon the hard law of international 
humanitarian law. The discussion here focuses on jus ad bellum rather than jus in bello because the use 
of force more clearly reflects the fundamental security policies of the state rather than decisions of 
individual actors. However, where a state institutes policies in violation of jus in bello, security threat 
focal points can arise. 
 170. DUNBABIN, supra note 162, at 427. 
 171. ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 215–16 (“[T]he claim that there was a request by the 
legitimate authorities of Hungary was rejected by the majority of States . . . .”). 
 172. Id. at 247 (“The objections made by most of the members of the Security Council were that 
there was no request by the Czechoslovak Government and that there was no external threat or attack 
on Czechoslovakia.”). 
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Czech Party held a defiant emergency Congress and elected an 
alternative leadership.
173
 
Such tactics illustrated Soviet attempts to maintain a colorable argument 
of compliance with international law. Failing in these attempts, Soviet 
interventionism cemented its reputation as Europe’s preeminent security 
threat. In fact, the Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968 pronounced the Soviet 
intention to invade any Eastern European state in which capitalism 
threatened communism—making it official Soviet policy to violate the 
fundamental international norm of sovereignty.
174
 
Meanwhile, in the South, it was the United States that relied on 
intervention in pursuit of its containment policy. With the NATO alliance 
formed by 1949, however, subsequent U.S. interventions in the distant 
third world resulted primarily in strategic reputational costs vis-à-vis those 
weaker states. Walt explains that because those third world countries were 
less powerful potential allies than the medium powers of Europe and Asia, 
American interventions in the South were less costly than those of the 
Soviets in the North.
175
 
Most U.S. Cold War interventions—either overt or covert—took place 
in Latin America. For example, the United States supported the 1954 coup 
in Guatemala, the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and anti-communist forces 
in Central America during the 1980s; it also undertook small-scale 
military interventions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 
1983, and Panama in 1989.
176
 Remarkably, in 1986 the International Court 
of Justice formally pronounced that the United States had illegally used 
force in supporting the Contras in Nicaragua.
177
  
Yet Latin American states were historically so weak and 
geographically isolated from potentially more powerful allies that 
resistance to the regional hegemon was futile.
178
 This drastic power 
asymmetry throughout the Western Hemisphere explained Latin American 
states’ unique tendency to bandwagon with the United States rather than 
 
 
 173. DUNBABIN, supra note 162, at 448–49. 
 174. The Brezhnev Doctrine was first articulated in S. Kovalev’s September 26, 1968 article 
Sovereignty and the International Obligations of Socialist Countries in the official Soviet newspaper, 
Pravda. The article asserted that “the interest of maintaining socialism in every country of the socialist 
commonwealth must take precedence over the sovereignty of individual socialist states . . . .” KAREN 
DAWISHA, THE KREMLIN AND THE PRAGUE SPRING 376 (1984). 
 175. Walt, supra note 8, at 33, 38. 
 176. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 199–202, 238–51. See generally WALTER LAFEBER, 
INEVITABLE REVOLUTIONS: THE UNITED STATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2d ed. 1993) (detailing U.S. 
interventions in Central America during the Cold War).  
 177. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 18–19 (June 27). 
 178. See Walt, supra note 8, at 36. 
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balance against it.
179
 Nonetheless, the United States was generally the 
greatest external threat to Latin America during the Cold War—in terms of 
offensive intentions, proximity, aggregate power, and offensive 
capabilities—and those states that were not ruled by U.S.-backed dictators 
often looked to the Soviet Union for support.
180
 
For Eurasian states in close proximity to the Soviet Union, U.S. 
interventions in remote Latin America were not nearly as threatening as 
the Soviet violations discussed above. Moreover, because the United 
States had indicated in its treaties that it would not abandon the Monroe 
Doctrine, its interventionist intentions were formally circumscribed to the 
Western Hemisphere.
181
 The United States did not invoke the Monroe 
Doctrine itself (as opposed to the related treaty provisions) as legal 
justification for interventions in Latin America during the Cold War.
182
 
Yet the various manifestations of the Monroe Doctrine “may be viewed as 
the clearest communication to adversaries that expansions of power and 
changes in alliance pattern in the designated zones will be opposed by 
 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., LAFEBER, supra note 176, at 340 (describing Soviet aid to Cuba and Central 
America).  
 181. The treaty establishing the League of Nations had explicitly provided: “Nothing in this 
Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of 
arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of 
peace.” League of Nations Covenant art. 21. The analogous provision in the UN Charter states: 
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” UN Charter 
art. 52, para. 1. In the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (“the Rio Pact”) and the 
1948 Charter of the Organization of American States (“OAS”), the United States inserted language 
meant to preserve its ability to legally intervene in the hemisphere via those regional arrangements. 
LAFEBER, supra note 176, at 94–96. Thus, while the Brezhnev Doctrine postdated the 1955 Warsaw 
Pact—which contained no exception to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference (unlike the 
OAS Charter)—the Monroe Doctrine predated and was partially incorporated into American ISL 
commitments. See id. at 95 (noting the “loophole” in Article 23 of the OAS Charter). President James 
Monroe conceived the doctrine in 1823 to defend Latin American sovereignty from European 
interference, but President Theodore Roosevelt’s corollary altered its meaning: “Eighty years later the 
power balance had shifted to the United States, and the Doctrine itself shifted to mean that Latin 
Americans should now be controlled by outside (that is, North American) intervention if necessary.” 
Id. at 38. 
 182. Compare John Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World 
Order, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 115 (1986) (“No American spokesman—or serious scholar—has 
invoked the Monroe Doctrine as a legal basis for U.S. actions in Central America [since the 1930s].”), 
with Organization of American States Tenth Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Resolution of Inter-American Force, May 6, 1965, OEA/Ser. F/II.10, OAS Doc. 39 (English) 
Rev. Corr., 4 I.L.M. 594 (invoking the Rio Pact to create an Inter-American force to restore order in 
the Dominican Republic), and Gerald M. Boyd, Honduras is Told U.S. Will Defend It, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 22, 1985, at A5 (indicating Reagan administration officials said the U.S. commitment to defend 
Honduras against Communist aggression was in fact “a reaffirmation of obligations that already are 
found under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, known as the Rio Treaty, and the 
Charter of the Organization of American States.”).  
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force.”183 Therefore, even assuming those U.S. interventions within the 
hemisphere were inconsistent with international law, they were relatively 
distinguishable and did not significantly undermine the credibility of its 
ISL commitments elsewhere. Regardless, the Soviet threat to the medium 
powers of Europe and Asia was so clear that the United States could 
threaten weaker Latin American states without losing the power advantage 
it gained from its key allies. 
American interventions in Korea and Vietnam held the potential for 
greater threat perception by the medium powers because they were much 
larger in scale and projected power beyond the Western Hemisphere. A 
1950 UN Security Council Resolution, however, authorized member states 
to “furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary 
to repel the armed attack [by North Korea] and to restore international 
peace and security in the area.”184 The international legality of the use of 
force in Vietnam was far less clear, but the United States at least had a 
colorable argument that it was assisting in the self-defense of South 
Vietnam.
185
 On a much smaller scale, the United States also intervened 
beyond the Western Hemisphere in 1958 in Lebanon at its request, in 1980 
in an attempt to rescue hostages in Iran, and in 1986 by bombing Libya in 
response to terrorist attacks.
186
 Of these operations, the Libyan bombing 
was of the most dubious international legality,
187
 but it was too little and 
came too late to significantly alter Cold War threat perceptions.  
This preliminary assessment of U.S. Cold War interventions indicates 
that they posed a level of threat that was inadequate to tilt a balance of 
power institutionalized across the Atlantic decades before. In the 
meantime, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was widely viewed as 
illegal, undoing any advantage in relative threat perception the Soviet 
Union might have gained from the U.S. interventions in the global 
South.
188
 
 
 
 183. W. Michael Reisman, Critical Defense Zones and International Law: The Reagan Codicil, 76 
AM. J. INT’L L. 589, 589 (1982).  
 184. S.C. Res. 83 U.N. Doc. S/RES/83 (June 27, 1950); see also ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 
262 (“[T]he use of force to defend South Korea was a legal collective self-defense action under Article 
51.”). 
 185. See ALEXANDROV, supra note 93, at 223 (“[T]he United States could justify its intervention 
in Vietnam under Article 51 only if: (i) South Vietnam was an independent State; (ii) South Vietnam 
was the victim of an armed attack; and (iii) the United States engaged in collective self-defense of 
South Vietnam on its request . . . .”). Alexandrov is doubtful that the Vietnam War fulfilled these 
criteria. Id. at 226. Regardless, since the United States had come to the aid of another NATO ally, 
France, in Indochina, the perceived threat to its critical European allies was minimized.  
 186. Id. at 184–85, 197, 217. 
 187. See id. at 184–85. 
 188. Id. at 227 (“The majority of Governments and world public opinion did not accept the Soviet 
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In sum, an initial review of Cold War noncompliance confirms Walt’s 
assertion that the Soviet Union threatened the developed world but not the 
former colonies, while the opposite was true for America.
189
 Repeated 
Soviet violations of wartime agreements and illegal interventions in 
Eastern Europe cemented an imbalance of power early in the Cold War, 
which could not be undone by less costly U.S. interventions in the weaker 
third world. 
2. U.S.-Soviet Arms Control 
Bilateral arms control negotiations are a classic example of a prisoner’s 
dilemma.
190
 The United States and the Soviet Union had many conflicting 
interests during the Cold War, but they had a shared interest in reining in 
the nuclear arms race.
191
 The dilemma was that each side had to fear the 
other’s temptation to gain from unilateral defection. Although defection is 
the dominant strategy in a single-play prisoner’s dilemma game, the 
repeated interactions between the United States and the Soviet Union 
allowed reputations to form and cooperation to take place.
192
  
By focusing on reputation as well as reciprocal abrogation as a form of 
direct sanction, Guzman fully accounts for the foreseeable noncompliance 
costs prompting the Cold War adversaries to comply with their various 
arms treaties. But this is only by coincidence. Reciprocity will often be 
weak medicine; generally the prospect of “simple abrogation of [a] treaty 
will not be enough to prevent a violation.”193 Arms control treaties, 
however, happen to be one area where reciprocity matters greatly because 
increased armament itself is a standard response to security threat. If one 
party were to find that the other had defected, it would then increase its 
own nuclear stockpile. But such reciprocity should not be mistaken for a 
mere “tit-for-tat” strategy meant to induce compliance,194 nor disregard for 
a suddenly obsolete treaty. Rather, it also reflects strategic reputational 
costs; a clear violation of an arms control treaty would spotlight defection 
 
 
Union’s legal arguments [regarding the Afghanistan invasion].”). 
 189. Walt, supra note 8, at 8–9. 
 190. See Guzman, supra note 3, at 1842–47 (explaining that in a simple prisoner’s dilemma, 
where “(1) each country is better off if it violates the agreement while the other country complies, and 
(2) both are better off if they both comply than if they both violate,” both countries can be expected to 
violate the agreement due to uncertainty regarding each other’s intentions). 
 191. GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 30. 
 192. Id. at 32. 
 193. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1867.  
 194. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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and a lack of restraint, leading to increased armament to balance against 
the threatening violator.  
Mercer explains that “when an adversary behaves congruent with our 
negative expectations, we make corresponding dispositional attributions 
(even though we would judge our own similar behavior as situational).”195 
He provides a Cold War example: 
When the Soviets shot down [Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983], 
President Reagan assumed it was intentional; he called it ‘an act of 
barbarism born of a society which wantonly disregards individual 
rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand 
and dominate other nations.’ The [U.S. Navy’s 1988 downing of an 
Iranian airliner] was inconsistent with Reagan’s prior beliefs about 
the American military and judged situational; the Soviet action was 
consistent with Reagan’s prior beliefs about the Soviet military and 
judged dispositional.
196
 
Understanding that ISL violations would naturally be perceived as 
threatening and provocative, the United States and the Soviet Union staked 
more than their reputations as reliable treaty partners on their bilateral 
arms control treaties. They also staked their reputations for restraint, 
thereby raising the foreseeable costs of noncompliance in order to alleviate 
the prisoner’s dilemma.  
To be sure, a large part of the perceived threat resulting from arms 
control defection could be the adversary’s increased offensive capability. 
Yet, given that these treaties preserved both parties’ core deterrent power, 
the most significant effect of a serious violation would have been the 
strategic reaction to perceived offensive intentions. For example, in 
response to Soviet exploitations of arms control treaty ambiguities on the 
eve of the 1985 Geneva Summit, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
and his assistant Richard Perle were “claiming that Soviet noncompliance 
constitutes a threat to vital American interests, justifies unilateral measures 
to enhance American security, and obviates the utility of negotiation.”197 
Secretary of State George Shultz and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, 
contended that the Soviets were largely in compliance, and President 
 
 
 195. MERCER, supra note 36, at 57.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Leffler, supra note 143, at 89 (“This line of reasoning closely resembles the arguments of 
Clifford, Elsey, and Truman at the onset of the Cold War.”). 
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Reagan pledged to continue to abide by existing arms control 
agreements.
198
  
Although the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1979 (“SALT II”) 
was never ratified by the United States and was ultimately abandoned, the 
Cold War adversaries generally complied with their various arms control 
treaties.
199
 President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, slowly learned to “trust but verify,” finally agreeing to the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (“INF”) Treaty at a December 1987 
summit in Washington.
200
 In contrast to the Truman years, during the 
1980s the United States and the Soviet Union gained faith in the 
credibility of each other’s commitments, with profound strategic 
consequences: 
Reagan and Gorbachev had walked their long road together out of 
the darkness of the Cold War. After the summits in Geneva, 
Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow, they could glimpse the dawn 
of a restored relationship in which the United States and the Soviet 
Union would once again cooperate in international affairs. While 
both sides still possessed terrifying nuclear power, Gorbachev and 
Reagan had set back the doomsday clock. Their meetings marked 
the beginnings of an even brighter period in U.S.-Soviet relations 
that would be ushered in during the Bush administration when 
Gorbachev released the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe and allowed 
the Germans to tear down the Berlin Wall.
201
  
These strategic benefits of arms control compliance resulted primarily 
from the successful communication of peaceful intentions, rather than the 
modest substantive achievements of the treaties themselves.  
To borrow Guzman’s logic from the BIT example discussed in Part III 
above: to the extent that the Cold War adversaries viewed the arms control 
treaties as credible commitments—made possible through the “trust but 
 
 
 198. LOU CANNON, PRESIDENT REAGAN: THE ROLE OF A LIFETIME 670–71 (2d ed. 2000). 
 199. See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Trust but Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control 
Treaties and Other International Agreements, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 40, 49–51 (1993) (“In 
response to issues raised by the United States, the Soviets often responded with considerable 
explanatory data; in other cases they ceased the questioned activity. For its part, the United States 
apparently went to substantial lengths to clarify ambiguous situations questioned by the Soviets . . . .”). 
Abbott also notes that although the Soviets failed to come forward with clarifying information 
regarding the Krasnoyarsk radar—often cited as an example of Soviet noncompliance—it later became 
clear to the United States that this “was not a significant treaty violation.” Id.  
 200. CANNON, supra note 198, at 696. The U.S. Senate ratified the INF Treaty in May 1988. Id. at 
701. 
 201. Id. at 709–10. 
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verify” approach—if a defection had undermined that confidence, then a 
portion of the increased armament would be attributable to the reputational 
effect resulting from the violation of international law.
202
  
Especially in multipolarity, where dispersed threats are more difficult 
to coordinate against, but also in bipolarity, defection from ISL poses a 
salient threat and invites other states to balance against the unpredictable 
defector.  
C. The Unipolar Moment 
In the first decade after the Cold War, the United States advocated 
German reunification, pushed a resilient NATO east across Europe, and 
coordinated multilateral coalitions to intervene militarily in the Persian 
Gulf, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—routinely marshaling international 
law violations as security threat focal points in doing so.
203
 In general, the 
United States continued to reaffirm its commitment to international law 
and was not viewed as an expansionist security threat, even as it exercised 
its overwhelming power in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.
204
 
Perhaps not coincidentally, the “unipolar moment”205 seems to have 
ended around the time that the United States began to push the limits of 
ISL.
206
 Certainly, other factors—most notably the economic rise of China, 
India, and Brazil—have contributed to the relative decline in U.S. power. 
 
 
 202. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1852 n.113; see supra Part III.B.  
 203. President George H. W. Bush cited Iraq’s illegal use of force in Kuwait in 1991, and 
President Bill Clinton cited human rights violations in the Balkans. See generally SAMANTHA POWER, 
“A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002). While scholars tend to 
agree that the intervention to defend sovereign Bosnia did not run afoul of international law, the 
Kosovo intervention has at times been described as “illegal but legitimate.” Brewster, supra note 4, at 
240; see also JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 937–57 (2d ed. 2006). In rationalist terms, “illegal but legitimate” 
corresponds with a formal violation that powerful states nonetheless agree is desirable policy. As 
Mercer has shown, desirable policies are less likely to result in dispositional attributions and, therefore, 
reputational costs. Nonetheless, the failure to obtain a Security Council resolution indicates that at 
least one powerful state does not view the use of force as desirable. The intervention in Kosovo 
resulted in a vivid security threat focal point from the Russian point of view.  
 204. See Joffe, supra note 61, at 16 (“America is different. It irks and domineers, but it does not 
conquer. It tries to call the shots and bend the rules, but it does not go to war for land and glory.”). 
Writing in 1997, Joffe noted the “genius” of American-made international institutions, id. at 27, and 
that “[w]here the United States does commit ground forces . . . their presence is accepted as 
legitimate,” id. at 21. 
 205. Charles Krauthammer, The Unipolar Moment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (1990). 
 206. See Richard N. Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, FOREIGN 
AFF. 44 (2008); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008).  
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Nonetheless, especially in its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States 
incurred significant costs, not only in blood and treasure, but also in terms 
of its reputation—reducing its soft power and prompting other states to 
reevaluate long-held strategies of bandwagoning with the United States 
rather than balancing against it. 
The attacks of September 11, 2001 focused U.S. attention on security 
threats posed by terrorists and those states that harbored them. In that 
sense, the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan was a reaction to a newer 
form of security threat focal point, arising where states fail to control non-
state threats emanating from within their borders. The Iraq War, however, 
was a more traditional conflict in that the United States and its allies 
targeted a rogue state. In Iraq, the United States alleged international law 
violations related to weapons of mass destruction as well as human rights.  
Iraq’s international law violations had made it a perennial target of the 
international community. In a world of myriad threats and asymmetric 
information, however, there was a lack of evidence regarding Iraq’s 
relative threat in 2003 and disagreement over the appropriate coordination 
strategy. Regardless of its perceived offensive intentions, Iraq’s aggregate 
power was low, and its “proximity” and offensive capabilities were 
overstated. Because the United States failed to convince the Security 
Council to explicitly authorize armed intervention and regime change, and 
since Iraq’s actions did not rise to the level of an imminent attack, many 
commentators viewed the 2003 invasion as an illegal use of force.
207
  
Reminiscent of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Bush Doctrine was 
perceived to have made it official U.S. policy to violate fundamental 
international law by engaging in preventive war.
208
 Nye argues that in the 
Iraq War, Bush “escaped the constraints of alliances and institutions that 
many in his administration chafed under, but he also produced
 
 
 207. See Slaughter, supra note 92, at 262–63. 
 208. Compare NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity 
.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf (“Legal scholars and international jurists often 
conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat—most often a visible 
mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of 
imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries. . . . [T]he United States 
cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”), with Chairman Anand Panyarachun, Report of the High-
level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, ¶ 191, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available 
at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf (“[T]he risk to the global order and the norm of non-
intervention on which it continues to be based is simply too great for the legality of unilateral 
preventive action, as distinct from collectively endorsed action, to be accepted.”). 
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. . . widespread anxieties about how the United States would use its 
preponderant power.”209 According to Walt: 
[T]he global response to U.S. primacy does not resemble the 
coalitions that defeated Germany in both world wars or the Soviet 
Union in the Cold War. The reason other nations have not forged a 
formal anti-U.S. alliance is simple: the United States does not pose 
the same level of threat. Yet states are beginning to join forces in 
more subtle ways, with the explicit aim of checking U.S. power. 
Rather than forming an anti-U.S. alliance, countries are “soft 
balancing”: coordinating their diplomatic positions to oppose U.S. 
policy and obtain more influence together.
210
 
It could be argued that the security threat focal point theory would have 
predicted greater strategic reputational costs resulting from the war in Iraq. 
One explanation could be that the legal issues were complex, partially 
obscuring the focal point.
211
 Geography might also explain why the U.S. 
threat did not provoke “hard balancing” strategies. In addition to 
America’s geographic isolation, the United States did not violate ISL in 
proximity to the medium powers, as had the more threatening Soviet 
Union and Germany. More importantly, in a unipolar era, other states 
found themselves in no position to balance forcefully against the 
American security apparatus upon which they often relied themselves, and 
there was no alternative pole with which they could ally as was the case 
during the Cold War. As Nye has written, “[w]hether other countries will 
unite to balance American power will depend on how the United States 
behaves as well as the power resources of potential challengers.”212 
Finally, the United States may continue to benefit from the reputation it 
built over the last half-century in the industrialized North as a benevolent 
superpower and sponsor of the UN Charter. Allies that have enjoyed low 
cost security for fifty years while perceiving little threat from the United 
States are hesitant to fund their own security at great cost or to seek 
alliances with emerging powers that are hardly known quantities. 
Nonetheless, strategic reputational costs did result from the war in Iraq. 
For Nye, examples of soft balancing in response to the American threat 
included the denial of bases and transport rights in Turkey and Saudi 
 
 
 209. NYE, supra note 65, at xii. 
 210. Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 113 (2005). 
 211. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 203, at 908–14. 
 212. See Nye, supra note 8, at 559 (emphasis added). 
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Arabia.
213
 Walt has cited further denials of informal cooperation, such as 
coordinated strategies to resist U.S. attempts to impose harsh sanctions on 
Iran and to stymie Bush’s control of Latin American affairs.214 Beyond 
soft balancing, Walt notes that states can adopt “asymmetric capabilities 
and methods,” including (1) conventional military capabilities designed to 
neutralize U.S. strengths, (2) terrorism, the classic “weapon of the weak,” 
and (3) weapons of mass destruction.
215
 Cyber and space warfare 
capabilities should be added to this list.
216
  
Although the magnitude and duration of the strategic costs of the Iraq 
War are still unclear, noncompliance reputational costs cannot be ignored. 
The geostrategic result of the first decade of the twenty-first century for 
the United States has been a decrease in its relative power coupled with an 
increase in its relative threat. This is not a promising trend, especially 
when compared to its Chinese rival. 
D. Return to Multipolarity 
Today we live in an increasingly multipolar world in which the 
potential sources of security threats are more dispersed. While Iran and 
North Korea, for example, make themselves the targets of strategic 
counteraction by defecting from international security institutions, China 
has pursued a rational strategy of maximizing its relative power and 
minimizing its relative threat. 
1. Coordinating Against Dispersed Threats  
Given the increased difficulty of coordination in multipolarity, the 
potential role of international norms to generate security threat focal points 
becomes more critical. According to Richard Haass, the multipolar world 
will “make it more difficult for Washington to lead on those occasions 
when it seeks to promote collective responses to regional and global 
challenges.”217 The increased difficulty of coordination in multipolarity is 
 
 
 213. NYE, supra note 65, at 27 (“Since the global projection of American military force in the 
future will require access and overflight rights from other countries, such soft balancing can have real 
effects on hard power.”). 
 214. Walt, supra note 210, at 113. 
 215. Id. at 113–14 (“The U.S. military predominates in the world of traditional forms of warfare. 
Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through traditional 
military actions and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods.” (quoting the Pentagon’s 2005 
National Defense Strategy)). 
 216. See infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing China’s reliance on such asymmetric capabilities). 
 217. Haass, supra note 206, at 51–52. Haass prefers the term “nonpolarity” (as opposed to 
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a matter of simple arithmetic: “Herding dozens is harder than herding a 
few.”218 Faced with these new coordination challenges, along with the 
relative decline of its power, the United States must rely even more 
heavily on the clear delineation of security threat focal points.  
For example, when Russia invaded the Georgian region of South 
Ossetia in August 2008, American leaders charged that it had violated 
international law.
219
 The dispute over an enclave in the Caucasus 
Mountains, with a population of only 70,000, was viewed as a disturbing 
sign of Russia’s lack of restraint, prompting reevaluations of the strategic 
outlook for NATO and the Balkans.
220
 Due to the unique circumstance in 
which an entire alliance had already been institutionalized to balance 
against the Russian threat—and considering its nuclear capabilities and 
permanent seat on the Security Council—Russia’s stand in South Ossetia 
may result in bandwagoning rather than balancing strategies at Europe’s 
periphery.
221
 Nonetheless, given the imperfect information in Washington 
and Brussels, the apparent violation of a fundamental norm of 
international law was a clearer focal point than fluctuations in Russia’s 
GDP, population, or defense spending, or even the slight southward shift 
in its troop alignment—reawakening the West to the Russian threat.222 
More recently, the United States has coordinated sanctions against Iran, 
continually pointing to Iranian violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (“NPT”) and subsequent Security Council resolutions requiring it 
to halt uranium enrichment.
223
 Given the right to peaceful development of 
civil nuclear energy programs under the NPT, the focal points seized on by 
 
 
“multipolarity”) because, he argues, power “will be diffuse rather than concentrated, and the influence 
of nonstate actors will increase.” Id.  
 218. Id.; see also Feldman, supra note 47, at 66 (“[T]he fragmentation of power after the cold war 
creates new dangers of disorder that need to be mitigated by the sense of regularity and predictability 
that only the rule of law can provide.”). 
 219. James Traub, Coming to Grips with Russia’s New Nerve, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at WK1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/weekinreview/07traub.html (“For the first time in 
almost 30 years—at least since the invasion of Afghanistan—Russia has come to be seen as a threat to 
world order.”). 
 220. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Russia Declares Its Recognition of Two Enclaves, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 27, 2008, at A1; Traub, supra note 219. 
 221. Traub, supra note 219. 
 222. Id. 
 223. See, e.g., INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA DOC. GOV/2011/7, IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL 
RESOLUTIONS IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN: REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL 1 n.2 (Feb. 25, 
2011) [hereinafter IAEA REPORT], available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/ 
2011/gov2011-7.pdf; Scott Peterson, NPT 101: Is Iran Violating the Nuclear Treaty?, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR (May 4, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0504/NPT-101-Is-
Iran-violating-the-nuclear-treaty. 
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the United States are sometimes as seemingly obscure (as a factual matter) 
as the timing of Iran’s reports to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.
224
 Yet, with asymmetric information, the U.S. attributes to Iran 
threatening intentions, based partly on its belligerent rhetoric, but also on 
its defection from the highly technical NPT regime.  
The U.S. approach to North Korea has also relied on NPT focal points. 
North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. Guzman explains that 
announcing an intention to withdraw, even if consistent with a treaty’s 
withdrawal provisions, can lead to reputational costs, since other states 
perceive a violation of the withdrawing state’s “implicit obligations.”225 
Stated differently, North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT, though 
perhaps legal, is perceived by other states as a threatening defection from 
the nuclear security regime. 
For Guzman, however, Iran and North Korea—“[a]lready pariah 
states”—have little reputational capital, and so one should not expect the 
NPT to deter them.
226
 As with the lesson Guzman took from Munich that 
international law is powerless in the security context, here again strategic 
reputational costs are overlooked. Iran and North Korea may already be 
unreliable treaty partners, but by defecting from international security 
institutions, they create security threat focal points, making themselves the 
targets of strategic counteraction.
227
 Especially with Iran, the technical 
NPT violation provided the legal hook for international coordination 
against the threatening (though allegedly civil) nuclear program. 
It may be that such strategic reputational costs are outweighed by the 
benefits of a nuclear program and, having decided to pursue nuclear arms, 
Iran could hardly comply with the inspection regime. Yet this line of 
thinking illustrates precisely how a well-designed ISL regime can function 
as an early warning system. Again, the claim here is not that 
noncompliance reputational costs will always outweigh the benefits of 
defection, but that violations of international law can spotlight security 
threats and provoke—or hasten—strategic balancing.  
 
 
 224. Peterson, supra note 223. 
 225. Guzman, supra note 3, at 1863. 
 226. GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 81. 
 227. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, James Glanz & Jo Becker, From Arabs to Israelis, Sharp Distress 
Over a Nuclear Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2010, at A1 (indicating the WikiLeaks cables reveal how 
the United States has organized a coalition against the Iranian threat, which has “unified Israel and 
many longtime Arab adversaries—notably the Saudis—in a common cause.”); Nicholas Kulish & 
Thom Shanker, West Rejects Iran’s Claim that Nuclear Deal is Near, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at 
A13 (reporting that U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that Iran had “done nothing to 
reassure the international community that they are prepared to comply with the N.P.T. or stop their 
progress toward a nuclear weapon”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
720 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:669 
 
 
 
 
Unlike Reagan and Gorbachev, who discerned their adversary’s 
peaceful intentions by using ISL to “trust but verify,” Iran has thwarted 
verification of its arms control compliance, throwing into sharp relief its 
threatening intentions.
228
 Whereas the generally compliant United States 
and Soviet Union enjoyed the strategic benefits of de-escalating a nuclear 
standoff, noncompliant Iran suffers the strategic costs of escalating a 
confrontation with its neighbors and the West.  
2. Sticky Institutions and the Chinese Model of Threat Minimization 
China has taken full advantage of multipolarity, pursuing an effective 
strategy of maximizing its relative power while minimizing its relative 
threat. In general, China has achieved a high rate of compliance with 
ISL.
229
 While Iran and North Korea have attracted negative attention by 
defecting from the NPT, China appears to have only gradually modernized 
its relatively small nuclear arsenal, consistent with its rights as a Nuclear 
Weapons State under the treaty.
230
 Instead, China has focused on 
expanding its military capabilities below the radar, in areas largely 
unregulated by international law.  
For example, Richard Clarke, former National Coordinator for Security 
and Counter-terrorism, describes the destruction that could result from a 
“cyber war” with China:  
[T]he fact that we might be able to turn off the Chinese air defense 
system will give most Americans limited comfort if in some future 
crisis the cyber warriors of the People’s Liberation Army have kept 
power off in most American cities for weeks, shut the financial 
markets by corrupting their data, and created food and parts 
shortages nationwide by scrambling the routing systems at major 
U.S. railroads. . . . What President would order the Navy into the 
 
 
 228. IAEA REPORT, supra note 223, at 10 (“Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to 
enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”). 
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano also concluded that “Iran is not implementing a number of its 
obligations” under the NPT regime and various Security Council resolutions. Id. 
 229. ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL 
SECURITY 66, 223, 226 (2007) (contrasting China’s high rate of compliance with the treaties 
negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament with its low rate of compliance in the human rights 
context). 
 230. Chris Buckley, China Military Paper Spells Out Nuclear Arms Stance, REUTERS, Apr. 22, 
2010; see also ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, SECOND CHANCE: THREE PRESIDENTS AND THE CRISIS OF 
AMERICAN SUPERPOWER 172 (2007) (referring to China’s “strategic self-restraint” in the nuclear 
context). 
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Taiwan Straits, as Clinton did in 1996, if he or she thought that a 
power blackout that had just hit Chicago was a signal and that 
blackouts could spread to every major American city if we got 
involved?
231
  
Clarke estimates that when cyber defense and cyber dependence are taken 
into consideration, along with cyber offense, the United States trails 
behind China, Russia, and even Iran and North Korea in “overall cyber 
war strength.”232 In addition, China has tested anti-satellite weapons, 
“signaling its resolve to play a major role in military space activities”—an 
area in which the United States has rejected a weapons ban treaty.
233
  
When states are unbound by international institutions in such issue 
areas, they face a security dilemma in the inevitable race to increase their 
offensive capabilities. Yet within those unregulated areas, any single 
state’s offensive intentions are less discernible because incremental threats 
never cross a bright line signaling defection—making rational security 
coordination more difficult. Since cyber and space warfare are largely 
unregulated by international law,
234
 China’s development of such 
offensive capabilities has increased its relative power vis-à-vis the United 
States without creating significant security threat focal points. In the virgin 
legal territories of cyberspace and outer space, the United States faces a 
dilemma similar to that Sir Eyre Crowe confronted a century ago: how to 
make “as patent and pronounced [and] as authoritative as possible” the 
distinction between peaceful Chinese expansion and unrestrained 
expansion, which would meet “determined opposition.”235 
Even in the less threatening field of IEL, China has exploited gaps in 
treaty coverage to pursue an apparently legal form of beggar-thy-neighbor 
 
 
 231. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 156 (2010). 
 232. Id. at 148; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Melissa Hathaway, The Cybersecurity Changes We 
Need, WASH. POST, May 29, 2010, at A19 (“[A] long-term trend of grabbing the economic gains from 
information technology advances and ignoring their security costs has reached a crisis point [in the 
United States].”). 
 233. William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A1; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Weighs a Ban on Weapons in Space, 
but U.S. Still Objects, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2008, at A11. 
 234. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Can We Stop the Global Cyber Arms Race?, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 
2010, at A17 (evaluating Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s call to “create norms of behavior among 
states and encourage respect for the global networked commons”); see also Duncan B. Hollis, An e-
SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 374 (2011).  
 235. Crowe, supra note 95, at 418. For example, Richard Clarke argues that the United States has 
a minimal ability to deter a cyber attack because it has not declared its intentions if such an attack were 
to occur, and adversaries may conclude that “the U.S. response to a cyber attack might be fairly 
minimal, or confused.” CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 231, at 176. 
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mercantilism.
236
 At the expense of its own consumers’ welfare, China’s 
currency manipulation has helped revise the international balance of 
economic power in its favor. However, in the absence of focal points 
generated by international law violations, the United States has struggled 
to coordinate an effective multilateral response.  
In sum, China has maximized its relative power by pursuing 
asymmetric military capabilities and a mercantilist revision of the balance 
of economic power. It has minimized its relative threat because its actions 
do not appear to violate international law. This strategy is especially 
significant because China is the first great power to rise in the era of 
modern international law. China’s rational strategy of power maximization 
and threat minimization illustrates the stickiness of international 
institutions: international law continues to operate as a restraint, even as 
the balance of power shifts. Thus far, China’s rise has been unobstructed 
by its rivals, largely due to perceptions that it is relatively restrained by 
international law. 
Two caveats are in order regarding China’s rational strategy of threat 
minimization. First, it remains to be seen whether China will continue to 
follow the path of restraint as its power grows. For example, recent 
disputes in the South China Sea suggest that China seeks to extend not 
only its exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) but also its strategic sphere 
beyond the twelve-nautical-mile territorial limit established by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).237 China’s 
 
 
 236. Scholars have analyzed China’s currency manipulation under the “hard law” of the WTO. 
Raj Bhala, Virtues, the Chinese Yuan, and the American Trade Empire, 38 HONG KONG L.J. 183, 219 
(2008) (noting that a currency manipulation complaint would rely on “an untested, even obscure, 
provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)”); Bryan Mercurio & Celine Sze 
Ning Leung, Is China a “Currency Manipulator”?: The Legitimacy of China’s Exchange Regime 
under the Current International Legal Framework, 43 INT’L LAW. 1257, 1257 (2009) (“[W]hile China 
clearly manipulates its currency, its measures are not inconsistent with the IMF Articles or the 
applicable WTO agreements.”). Scholars have also analyzed the “soft law” of the International 
Monetary Fund. Beth A. Simmons, The Legalization of International Monetary Affairs, 54 INT’L ORG. 
573, 594 (2000) (describing reputational costs of noncompliance with IMF norms distinguishable from 
direct sanctions or treaty exclusion: “governments want to convince markets that they provide a 
desirable venue for international trade and investment”). 
 237. See Thom Shanker, Chinese and Americans Soften Tone on Disputed Seas, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2010, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/13/world/asia/13gates.html; Jerome A. 
Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, High Stakes, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.cfr 
.org/china/high-stakes/p23594 (“It seems that China is putting forward an ‘historic’ claim to much of 
the South China Sea, but it has never clarified whether it is claiming these waters as internal waters, 
territorial sea, exclusive economic zone, extended continental shelf, or some status unique to the 
region.”); Jerome A. Cohen & Jon M. Van Dyke, Limits of Tolerance, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Dec. 
7, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/china/limits-tolerance/p23593 (“In [its EEZ], a coastal country has 
complete control over all living and nonliving resources and can limit marine scientific research by 
other countries. But the US argues—and the text and negotiating history of UNCLOS appear to 
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opaque interpretation of UNCLOS has created an incipient security threat 
focal point around which its Southeast Asian neighbors have begun to 
coordinate.
238
 Still, in contrast to the United States, China has ratified 
UNCLOS and continues to operate within its institutional framework.
239
 If 
it does not avoid conflict, however, China’s ability to influence 
interpretations of ISL—whether in regard to the South China Sea or 
Taiwan—will determine the magnitude of the resulting security threat 
focal point and strategic costs. 
Second, China does have a very poor human rights record.
240
 It has 
signed but not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,
241
 although it did ratify the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights.
242
 Even assuming that China has violated 
those human rights commitments that it has undertaken, it is unlikely that 
such violations would trigger security threat focal points. In contrast to 
liberated Europe in 1946, there is little expectation of a strategic contest 
between superpowers to exert influence over China’s population. Nor do 
China’s human rights violations threaten to destabilize a politically 
sensitive region, as was the case in the Balkans and most recently in 
Libya.
243
 International human rights law often does not directly concern 
relations between states because such treaties primarily obligate the state 
to ensure a baseline of decent treatment for its own citizens. From a 
rationalist point of view, human rights law is less likely than ISL to 
generate security threat focal points between states. Instead, human rights 
 
 
support it—that the ships and planes of other countries, military and commercial, have navigational 
rights to operate in and over these waters.”). But see Kevin Lim, China Says Will Not Threaten Anyone 
With Modern Military, REUTERS (June 5, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/05/us-
singapore-defence-idUSTRE7530O920110605 (“‘China is committed to maintaining peace and 
stability in the South China sea,’ [China’s defense minister] said[,] adding it stood by a 2002 code of 
conduct signed with members of the Association of South East Asian Nations to resolve peacefully the 
rival claims over the resource-rich region.”). 
 238. See Shanker, supra note 237, at A9.  
 239. Id. 
 240. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: CHINA 
(Apr. 8, 2011).  
 241. See Status of Treaties: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, Mar. 14, 2012, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no 
=N=4&chapter=4&lang=en. 
 242. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld 
/docid/3ae6b36c0.html. The treaty was ratified by China on March 27, 2001. Id. 
 243. See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, Libyan Immigrants Becoming Italian Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2011, at A4 (discussing the impact of Libyan unrest on a bilateral agreement with its 
European neighbor Italy). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
724 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:669 
 
 
 
 
advocates more often rely on normative and liberal theories of 
compliance.
244
 
V. CONCLUSION: A GROWING ROLE FOR SECURITY THREAT  
FOCAL POINTS 
International law reached a modern pinnacle in the decade following 
the Cold War.
245
 With “the end of history,” it appeared to some that 
democratic peace was upon us and the great power conflicts that had 
characterized nearly the entire twentieth century might never return. In a 
unipolar moment dominated by a relatively benign hegemon, international 
relations could focus on welfare maximization and a humanitarian vision 
of collective security. As unipolarity recedes, however, one should 
remember Professor Nye’s warning: “It is equally mistaken to pretend that 
the whole world is typified by Hobbesian realism or by Kantian 
[institutionalism].”246 When new security threats come into sharper focus 
in multipolarity, states will react with balancing strategies. 
As high stakes rivalries reemerge, how should states coordinate against 
security threats and allocate their own scarce resources toward defense? 
We have seen that the correct lesson of Munich was the rationality of 
coordinating for security around violations of ISL, rather than the need to 
respond to minor threats with unilateral force. This lesson is especially 
crucial to heed in multipolarity, where it is more difficult for states to 
coordinate against dispersed threats.  
Applying that lesson to U.S. relations in Latin America, for example, 
the United States should not resort to unilateral intervention in reaction to 
mere internal political threats, especially where its regional treaties 
provide no legal cover.
247
 In today’s increasingly globalized, democratic, 
 
 
 244. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 1; Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, Rational Choice, 
Reputation, and Human Rights Treaties, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1130 (2008) (“Guzman’s efforts to 
more fully describe the reputational aspects of international law within a rational choice framework are 
especially significant . . . . [Yet] explaining states’ entry into human rights treaties requires a broader 
conception of reputation than Rational Choice allows.” (citing GUZMAN, supra note 2)); Nye, supra 
note 8, at 559 (“When the society and culture of the hegemon are attractive, the sense of threat and 
need to balance it are reduced.”). 
 245. The Clinton years witnessed the dramatic development of international criminal law 
(including the creation of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals and the International Criminal Court), 
see DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 203, at 652–58, the creation of the WTO and its enforceable dispute 
settlement mechanism, id. at 829, the remarkable proliferation of investment treaties, id. at 861, and 
the trend toward humanitarian intervention that is often associated with the “responsibility to protect,” 
id. at 955. 
 246. NYE, supra note 11, at 208. 
 247. With the democratization of Latin America, the United States has found it more challenging 
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and multipolar world, the costs in threat perception (and adverse 
balancing) of maintaining an interventionist Monroe Doctrine will often 
exceed the strategic benefits.
248
 Instead, the United States should make 
clear its intentions to pursue mutual welfare gains, to support democracy 
at arm’s length, and to coordinate regional security around focal points of 
threat such as ISL violations. In fact, the United States has largely pursued 
such a rational strategy of restraint in Latin America since the end of the 
Cold War.
249
  
In general, for a powerful state, violations of ISL can lead to greater 
perceptions of threat, reducing its strategic advantage, especially as 
alternative poles of power emerge to balance against it. Even the greatest 
superpower, the United States, should not assume that its alliances are 
guaranteed in perpetuity, despite the stickiness of institutions such as 
NATO. Professor Feldman has noted that the United States has an ongoing 
“need to build and rebuild alliances—and law has historically been one of 
our best tools for doing so.”250 In addition, powerful states will rationally 
bargain from a position of strength to create favorable institutions in those 
areas still unregulated by ISL, in order to more efficiently coordinate 
security strategy.
251
 
Meanwhile, weaker states will seek credible commitments from more 
powerful states to attain lower cost security.
252
 It will often be irrational 
for a weaker state to violate its own ISL commitments because the 
resulting security threat focal point can make it a target of strategic 
balancing, as well as direct sanctions. 
 
 
to use regional treaties, such as the OAS Charter and the Rio Pact, to reduce the perceived threat of 
hemispheric interventions. See LAFEBER, supra note 176, at 284. Moreover, when the United States 
sided with Great Britain in the Falklands War against Argentina, its commitment to the regional 
alliance lost credibility. Id. 
 248. In other words, the Monroe Doctrine should be interpreted in its original sense, in defense of 
Latin American sovereignty, and the Roosevelt corollary should be abandoned. See id. at 38. 
 249. It would also be rational for the United States to pursue a similar strategy beyond the 
Western Hemisphere. Although the United States enjoyed Cold War alliances in both NATO and the 
Rio Pact, NATO provides the more promising model in multipolarity. While the United States resorted 
to costly interventions and dictatorships to maintain regional hegemony, it had a stronger alliance with 
Europe owed to its position as a powerful, yet less threatening, alternative to the Soviet Union. See 
supra Part IV.B.1. Alliances are more efficiently pursued by minimizing threat—often through 
compliance with ISL—while still offering the advantages of power. 
 250. Feldman, supra note 47, at 66. 
 251. See Ikenberry, supra note 11, at 45 (“[Institutions] allow powerful states to both lock in a 
favorable postwar order and overcome fears of domination and abandonment [among weaker 
states].”). 
 252. Id. (“Weak and secondary states get institutionalized assurances that they will not be 
exploited.”). 
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Thus, to return to the original question—When will it be rational for a 
state to comply with international law?—the answer appears to be: more 
often than has previously been thought. The potential reputational costs of 
violating international law are not limited to treaty exclusion but also 
include strategic costs. Violations of ISL generate security threat focal 
points, spotlighting the violator’s defection from the international security 
institution, evidencing its unpredictability and lack of restraint, and 
providing an impetus for states to balance against it.  
The rational security strategy for states—best illustrated by a rising 
China—is to maximize their relative power while minimizing their relative 
threat. In today’s world of extensive international legal commitments, 
minimizing relative threat will often involve compliance with international 
law. Therefore, states may rationally create a presumption in favor of 
compliance with ISL, rebuttable where identifiable benefits of defection 
are clearly greater than the potentially high reputational costs.
253
  
Although making conceptual use of realist tools, the security threat 
focal point theory suggests that international institutions will often endure 
beyond the balance of power existing at the time of their creation.
254
 
International law is not epiphenomenal, as structural realists maintain. 
States that did not shape the current framework of international law face 
significant strategic costs in opting to violate ISL norms perceived as not 
in their interests. It follows that the negotiation of treaties and the 
contestation over evolving interpretations of ISL are of great consequence 
to states’ strategic interests. Rational states will fully engage in the 
international legal process in order to maximize their security, in addition 
to their welfare. 
 
 
 253. This presumption in favor of compliance is distinguishable from that asserted by 
management theorists because it is based on an analysis of the unitary state’s rational compliance 
decision, rather than the tendencies of the state’s domestic institutions. See Chayes & Chayes, supra 
note 1, at 179 (“Compliance is the normal organizational presumption.”). A rational state must 
recognize varying levels of information (or rationality) among its potential rivals, leading to 
uncertainty regarding the attributions flowing from noncompliance. Therefore, a risk-averse state will 
rationally create a presumption against the violation of ISL, while a risk-seeking state might not. 
 254. This theory thereby follows Keohane’s guidance that realist concepts should be 
“supplemented, though not replaced, by theories stressing the importance of international institutions.” 
KEOHANE, supra note 13, at 14. 
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